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Cost-Benefit Analysis and Agency
Independence
Michael A. Livermoret
The presidential mandate that agency rule makings be subjected to cost-
benefit analysis and regulatory review is one of the most controversial develop-
ments in administrative law over the past several decades. There is a prevailing
view that the role of cost-benefit analysis in the executive branch is to help facilitate
control of agencies by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA).
This Article challenges that view, arguing that cost-benefit analysis in fact helps
preserve agency autonomy in the face of oversight. This effect stems from the con-
straints imposed on reviewers by the regularization of cost-benefit-analysis meth-
odology and the fact that agencies have played a major role in shaping that meth-
odology. The autonomy-preserving effect of cost-benefit analysis has been largely
ignored in debates over the institution of regulatory review. Ultimately, cost-benefit
analysis has ambiguous effects on agency independence, simultaneously preserv-
ing, informing, and constraining agency power.
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INTRODUCTION
In a 1981 law-review article, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the
Separation of Powers,' Professor Cass Sunstein worried that
President Ronald Reagan's recently signed Executive Order re-
quiring that the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
(OIRA) in the White House review new regulations "accords
enormous discretion to those who are charged with interpreting"
the order's cost-benefit-analysis requirement. 2 Sunstein viewed
the relevant "who" as being primarily the president and OIRA.3
This Article will argue that the past three decades show
Sunstein (who directed OIRA from 2009 to 2012) to have been
half right. The power to interpret the cost-benefit-analysis re-
quirement is important. But it is agencies, rather than OIRA,
that have taken the leading role in developing the methodology.
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in particular has
promoted a wide range of methodological choices that have af-
fected not only how environmental regulation is valued, but also
the analyses carried out by other agencies and the conduct of
centralized review by OIRA.
One telling example of EPA's methodological influence is
the value assigned to mortality-risk reduction, sometimes called
the "value of statistical life." 4 The largest quantifiable benefit of
1 Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Separation of Powers, 23 Ariz L
Rev 1267 (1981).
2 Id at 1276.
3 Id.
4 Environmental Protection Agency, Guidelines for Preparing Economic Analyses
xv (Dec 17, 2010) ("EPA, 2010 Guidelines").
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many environmental rules is reduction in life-threatening risk:
air-quality regulations save hundreds of thousands of lives every
year. 5 Estimates of the value of these types of rules can differ by
an order of magnitude,6 and EPA has devoted considerable re-
sources to developing its preferred estimates7 Based on that
work, EPA has been able to defend monetary estimates of bene-
fits from air-quality regulations of over $1 trillion per year.8
Agency methodological influence has important consequenc-
es for understanding the role of cost-benefit analysis in the ad-
ministrative state. The prevailing view is that cost-benefit anal-
ysis serves mainly as a mechanism for OIRA to assert authority
over agencies, in service of presidential control over the execu;
tive branch. 9 The real story is more complex. Over the past sev-
eral decades, cost-benefit analysis has become regularized,
which constrains how OIRA evaluates rules. Those constraints
have, to an important extent, been shaped by agencies. This dy-
namic creates opportunities for agencies to use cost-benefit
analysis as a bulwark against review. Within OIRA and agen-
cies, career bureaucrats are better positioned than political ap-
pointees to influence cost-benefit-analysis methodology, a situa-
tion that may affect how political control is exercised. At the
same time, the cost-benefit-analysis requirement incentivizes
agencies to allocate internal resources, produce information, and
interact with outside parties in ways that may affect their regu-
latory priorities. Influencing cost-benefit-analysis methodology
also provides a mechanism for agencies to affect each other. Far
from simply facilitating, in a straightforward way, the imposi-
tion of presidential control over the executive branch, cost-
benefit analysis has a large number of subtle effects on agency
5 See Environmental Protection Agency, The Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air
Act from 1990 to 2020 7-3 (Apr 2011) ("EPA, Second Prospective Study") (finding that 85
percent of benefits from rules under the 1990 Clean Air Amendments will be from mor-
tality-risk reduction in 2020).
6 See W. Kip Viscusi and Joseph E. Aldy, The Value of a Statistical Life: A Critical
Review of Market Estimates throughout the World, 27 J Risk & Uncertainty 5, 54 (2003)
("[Tihe historical impetus for the adoption of the [value of statistical life] methodology
was that these values boosted assessed benefits by roughly an order of magnitude, im-
proving the attractiveness of agencies' regulatory efforts.").
7 See generally Environmental Protection Agency, Guidelines for Preparing Eco-
nomic Analyses (Sept 2000) ("EPA, 2000 Guidelines").
8 EPA, Second Prospective Study at 7-9 table 7-5 (cited in note 5) (showing the
central estimate of monetary benefits of regulation under the 1990 Clean Air Act
Amendments in 2010 as $1.3 trillion).
9 See, for example, Richard H. Pildes and Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regu-
latory State, 62 U Chi L Rev 1, 3 (1995).
2014]
The University of Chicago Law Review
behavior, with the overall effect ambiguous from the perspective
of political control.
The presidential mandate that agency rule makings be sub-
jected to cost-benefit analysis and regulatory review is one of the
most controversial developments in administrative law over the
past several decades. The discussion about the consequences of
this move has occupied not only legal scholars and law-journal
editors,10 but also academics representing a wide range of fields,
from philosophy"l to political science,12 as well as public offi-
cials,13 advocacy organizations, 14 and other opinion leaders.15
But this extensive empirical and normative literature has
largely failed to recognize the degree to which agencies have
shaped the methodology of cost-benefit analysis and, along with
it, the practice of regulatory review. Cost-benefit analysis com-
piles risk analyses, engineering reports, economic models, and
valuation studies to generate an overall assessment of regulato-
ry impacts in economic terms. At least in its current form, this
technique does not provide uncontestable insights into the ef-
fects of regulation, even if the scientific predicates to cost-benefit
analysis were clear.16 There are hard methodological choices in
10 See Don Bradford Hardin Jr, Why Cost-Benefit Analysis? A Question (and Some
Answers) about the Legal Academy, 59 Ala L Rev 1135, 1136-37 (2008) (documenting the
rise in cost-benefit-related legal scholarship from 27 articles in 1981 to 628 by 2005).
11 See, for example, Elizabeth Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics 190-216
(Harvard 1995); Mark Sagoff, We Have Met the Enemy and He Is Us or Conflict and Con-
tradiction in Environmental Law, 12 Envir L 283, 286-88 (1982).
12 See, for example, Joseph Cooper and William F. West, Presidential Power and
Republican Government: The Theory and Practice of OMB Review of Agency Rules, 50 J
Polit 864, 878-80 (1988); Terry M. Moe, The Politicized Presidency, in John E. Chubb
and Paul E. Peterson, eds, The New Direction in American Politics 235, 235 (Brookings
1985).
13 See, for example, Office of Senator Mark R. Warner, Press Release, Warner,
Portman, Collins Introduce Legislation to Provide Regulatory Relief (Aug 1, 2012), online
at http://www.warner.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/mobile/pressreleases?ID=c22cOa48-8ab7
-46bb-894e-414b35220324 (visited May 15, 2014) (discussing a bill to authorize the pres-
ident to extend regulatory-review requirements to independent agencies).
14 See, for example, OMB Watch, Press Release, OMB Watch Calls on the Obama
Administration to Revise Regulatory Process (Jan 29, 2010), online at
http:ldev.ombwatch.org/node/10738 (visited May 15, 2014) ("Currently, agencies are re-
quired to perform any number of analyses before writing new standards, including the
notoriously unreliable cost-benefit analysis.").
15 See, for example, Ruth Marcus, Sledgehammer Politics, Wash Post A19 (Apr 25,
2012).
16 For arguments concerning the general indeterminacy of cost-benefit analysis, see
Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 Stan L
Rev 387, 388 (1981); Richard S. Markovits, Duncan's Do Nots: Cost-Benefit Analysis and
the Determination of Legal Entitlements, 36 Stan L Rev 1169, 1188-96 (1984). There is
[81:609
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any sophisticated analysis. How these choices are made can
have extremely important effects on the results of cost-benefit
analysis.
The central argument of this Article is that agencies have
played an important role in the evolution of cost-benefit analy-
sis, which poses a challenge to the prevailing view of cost-benefit
analysis as primarily a means for the center to exert control over
the periphery. Because it makes up such a substantial portion of
OIRA's docket, EPA receives much of the focus here, although
other agencies have also had an important influence. EPA has
built substantial in-house economics capacity, which far dwarfs
that of OIRA and has made significant methodological contribu-
tions, fostering the elaboration of concepts such as nonuse value
and discounting that are fundamental to how cost-benefit analy-
sis is carried out. These contributions have affected EPA's rule
makings, how OIRA carries out its review, and the analytic
practices of other agencies.
This Article will proceed in four Parts. Part I discusses the
prevailing view that cost-benefit analysis is a mechanism for
OIRA to exert control over agencies. This view is held by both
proponents and opponents of regulatory review. Part I also ex-
amines recent literature on ways that agencies attempt to
thwart OIRA review in individual rule makings. Finally, this
Part introduces and defends a novel argument that the regulari-
zation of cost-benefit analysis into a standardized methodology
actually constrains OIRA review, creating a safe harbor in which
agencies are relatively protected from interference.
This safe harbor is particularly important because agencies
are well positioned to influence cost-benefit-analysis methodolo-
gy and in fact have been successful in doing so. Part II focuses in
particular on EPA and the many advantages it has in influenc-
ing the development of cost-benefit analysis. These advantages
include substantial economics capacity, the ability to fund out-
side research, and informational advantages during the process
of review. Ways in which EPA differs from other agencies are al-
so discussed. Part III charts the agency's influence over several
of the most important questions in cost-benefit-analysis method-
substantial literature on scientific uncertainty in regulatory decision making as well. See
National Research Council, Science and Judgment in Risk Assessment 160-87 (National
Academy 1994). See also Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regula.
tion, 95 Colum L Rev 1613, 1619-22 (1995).
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ology, including how lifesaving benefits are valued and tech-
niques for assigning monetary value to nonmarket goods.
Part IV discusses the consequences of the insights in Parts
I, II, and III for understanding the place of cost-benefit analysis
in the regulatory state. Effects within both the standard princi-
pal-agent framework and a deliberative model of intraexecutive
relations are discussed. The upshot is that cost-benefit analysis
does not simply promote presidential power, but has a wide
range of complex and sometimes confounding effects on agency
behavior. But if this conclusion is correct, it raises the question
of why presidents have been so consistent in their support of
cost-benefit analysis over the past three decades. Part IV.C pro-
vides potential explanations for this seeming paradox. Finally,
Part IV.D discusses the importance of the descriptive observa-
tions in this Article for the broader normative debate over regu-
latory review and cost-benefit analysis.
I. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND AGENCY OVERSIGHT
Executive Order 12291, signed by President Ronald Reagan
in 1981,17 established the structure for executive review of agen-
cy rule makings based on cost-benefit analysis. 18 Under the or-
der, agencies were required to conduct cost-benefit analysis of
proposed rule makings that will have significant economic con-
sequences and submit those analyses to OIRA for review. Agen-
cies were also instructed to "refrain from publishing [their] ...
proposed rulemaking until such review is concluded."'19 With this
order, OIRA took on a major oversight role, giving it a kind of
veto power over agency rule making.
This new role for OIRA, which was viewed as a substantial
expansion of presidential power over administrative agencies,20
17 Executive Order 12291, 46 Fed Reg 13193 (1981).
18 For more information on antecedents to Reagan's move, see Jim Tozzi, OIRA's
Formative Years: The Historical Record of Centralized Regulatory Review preceding
OIRA's Founding, 63 Admin L Rev 37, 40-62 (Special Edition 2011) (giving a historical
overview of review before the Reagan administration). Cost-benefit analysis also has a
history that long precedes the institution of regulatory review. See generally Jonathan
B. Wiener, The Diffusion of Regulatory Oversight, in Michael A. Livermore and Richard
L. Revesz, eds, The Globalization of Cost-Benefit Analysis in Environmental Policy 123
(Oxford 2013); W. Michael Hanemann, Preface, in StAle Navrud, ed, Pricing the Europe-
an Environment 9 (Oxford 1992) (discussing the role of water projects in development of
cost-benefit analysis in United States).
19 46 Fed Reg at 13195 (cited in note 17).
20 See, for example, William F. West and Joseph Cooper, Legislative Influence v.
Presidential Dominance: Competing Models of Bureaucratic Control, 104 Polit Sci Q 581,
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has been hotly debated ever since. Although it remains contro-
versial, this basic architecture has persisted for the past thirty
years, through four subsequent presidential administrations
from both political parties.21
In this institutional context, cost-benefit analysis is widely
believed to help promote OIRA dominance over agencies.
Whether by providing information for reviewers or masking po-
litical machinations behind a technocratic veneer, cost-benefit
analysis is seen by both proponents and opponents of regulatory
review as a tool for central reviewers to reduce the discretion of
administrative agencies. Part L.A discusses this prevailing view.
Agencies are not assumed to submit willingly to the imposi-
tion of central control, and scholars have examined a number of
ways in which agencies resist. Part I.B reviews recent scholar-
ship on how agencies use their discretion over the form of rule
making or the extent of regulatory-impact analysis that accom-
panies a rule to thwart review. The long-term effect of agency
development on cost-benefit methodology, which seeks not to
avoid review but to influence how it is carried out, has not yet
been given adequate attention.
Part I.C argues that the institutional relationships between
agencies and OIRA have incentivized the regularization of cost-
benefit analysis over the past three decades. Now that cost-
benefit analysis is a more or less standardized methodology, it
constrains how both agencies and OIRA evaluate rules. Within
the heartland of this standardized methodology, agencies enjoy a
kind of safe harbor that protects them from overly intrusive re-
view. This safe harbor becomes especially important when, as
will be explored in Parts II and III, agencies are well positioned
to influence its contours through methodological development.
590 (1990) (arguing that the Executive Order 12291 was among several important moves
by presidents as well as courts toward greater presidential authority over regulatory de-
cision making).
21 The executive order adopted by President Clinton in 1993 made several im-
portant reforms to the process but did not change the basic structure or the cost-benefit-
analysis requirement. See generally Executive Order 12866, 58 Fed Reg 51735 (1993).
President George W. Bush continued under the Clinton order, making only minor chang-
es at the end of his term. See generally Executive Order 13422, 72 Fed Reg 2763 (2007).
President Obama's executive order on regulatory review explicitly extends the Clinton
order. See Executive Order 13563, 76 Fed Reg 3821, 3821 (2011).
2014]
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A. OIRA Dominance
There are two standard justifications for regulatory re-
view. 22 The first is that OIRA helps promote presidential control
over administrative agencies.23 Defenders of regulatory review
have argued that OIRA is a better proxy for presidential prefer-
ences than are agencies, and OIRA's role is to ensure that agen-
cy actions fall in line with the president's policy agenda.24 Ac-
cording to this line of thinking, cost-benefit analysis helps
facilitate presidential power by reducing information asymme-
tries between agencies and OIRA, allowing for more effective
oversight.25
The second standard justification for regulatory review is
that it facilitates technocratic values by promoting economic ef-
ficiency or discouraging bureaucratic myopia.26 Within this
framework, cost-benefit analysis again serves as an oversight
tool, helping to correct for cognitive biases facing agencies27 and
facilitating review by the dispassionate personnel at OIRA who
are removed from the daily pressures facing agency staff.28
Under both accounts, cost-benefit analysis is a means for
the center to exert control over the periphery within the admin-
istrative state. The flow of influence is assumed to run from
OIRA down to agencies. Though residual agency autonomy is
expected, the purpose of cost-benefit analysis is to reduce the
costs of OIRA oversight over regulatory decision making, cabin-
ing agency discretion as much as possible within political or
technocratic bounds given OIRA's time and resource constraints
and the vast size of the federal bureaucracy.29
22 See Michael A. Livermore and Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review, Capture,
and Agency Inaction, 101 Georgetown L J 1337, 1340 (2013).
23 See, for example, Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv L Rev
2245, 2278-79 (2001).
24 See Christopher C. DeMuth and Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review of
Agency Rulemaking, 99 Harv L Rev 1075, 1081-82 (1986); John D. Graham, Saving
Lives through Administrative Law and Economics, 157 U Pa L Rev 395, 465-66 (2008).
25 See Eric A. Posner, Controlling Agencies with Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Positive
Political Theory Perspective, 68 U Chi L Rev 1137, 1143 (2001).
26 See DeMuth and Ginsburg, 99 Harv L Rev at 1080-82 (cited in note 24).
27 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J Legal
Stud 1059 (2000); Pildes and Sunstein, 62 U Chi L Rev 1 (cited in note 9).
28 See Christopher C. DeMuth and Douglas H. Ginsburg, Rationalism in Regula-
tion, 108 Mich L Rev 877, 902-03 (2010).
29 This interpretation of cost-benefit analysis as reducing monitoring cost is based
on a principal-agent interpretation of the executive branch. See Part IV.A.
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The basic structure of review has features that are con-
sistent with a view of OIRA dominance. OIRA has been referred
to as the "toughest kid of the block" in intraexecutive conflicts.30
The office has a number of formal powers, including the ability
to delay rules, and its location within the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) gives it access to an even greater number of
informal mechanisms of control. 31 OIRA heads also sometimes
claim to have a closer connection to presidential preferences
than do political appointees within agencies.32 If this view is
widespread within an administration, it surely increases OIRA's
bargaining power. Even agencies' formal power to publish rules
in the federal register absent OIRA review33 is limited by practi-
cal realities. Personal and political loyalties ensure that the
president's demand that rules be submitted to OIRA is likely to
be heeded in all but the most extraordinary circumstances. 34
But it is not always enough to be tough; the effective exer-
cise of power requires smarts as well, and information about
regulatory choices is a well-known advantage held by agencies. 36
Professor Eric Posner has argued that cost-benefit analysis facil-
itates the exercise of centralized authority by serving as an in-
formation-forcing tool. According to this view, cost-benefit anal-
ysis translates "an incomplete information game into a complete
30 Sidney A. Shapiro, Political Oversight and the Deterioration of Regulatory Policy,
46 Admin L Rev 1, 12 (1994) (quoting James Miller III, the first director of OIRA).
31 See id at 11 (discussing OMB's ability to "refus[e] to clear congressional testimo-
ny, and reduc[e] the agency's budget requests to be submitted to Congress").
32 See DeMuth and Ginsburg, 108 Mich L Rev at 903-04 (cited in note 28) ("OIRA
... is charged primarily with implementing the president's policies in a way that the
heads of the program agencies cannot be counted upon to do."); Sally Katzen, A Reality
Check on an Empirical Study: Comments on "Inside the Administrative State," 105 Mich
L Rev 1497, 1503-04 & n 41 (2007) (arguing that OIRA "answer[s] to the president," and
that differences of opinion between OIRA personnel and political appointees at agencies
stem from the "broader lens" that OIRA staff applies).
33 See Lisa Heinzerling, Statutory Interpretation in the Era of OIRA, 33 Fordham
Urban L J 1097, 1114-15 n 118 (2006) (citing the EPA Administrators' powers under the
Clean Water Act).
34 See Moe, The Politicized Presidency at 256-58 (cited in note 12) (discussing the
growing importance of appointment power for ensuring loyalty of top agency officials).
35 See Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast, Administra-
tive Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J L, Econ & Org 243, 247 (1987) ("A
consequence of delegating authority to bureaucrats is that they may become more expert
about their policy responsibilities than the elected representatives who created their bu-
reau.").
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information game,"36 or at least a game with greater infor-
mation.37
Opponents of cost-benefit analysis tend to agree that it is a
mechanism for controlling agencies. 3s The controversy has typi-
cally been less about whether cost-benefit analysis facilitates
control by OIRA than about how, and about whether that out-
come is normatively desirable. For Posner, cost-benefit analysis
conveys information; for others, it serves to "legitimate presiden-
tial power";39 still others view it as embedding particular sub-
stantive commitments consistent with presidential views. 40
While there is disagreement about the particulars, it is fair to
characterize a dominant view, in which the role of cost-benefit
analysis is to increase the power of reviewers at OIRA and facili-
tate the centralization of regulatory authority.41
B. Agency Resistance
Agencies have not been assumed to submit passively to the
imposition of authority by the White House; indeed, they have
many potential routes to avoid the imposition of OIRA control.
Perhaps most important, the president and Congress share
oversight authority, and agencies can exploit differences in poli-
cy preferences between their principals to generate greater dis-
cretion.42
36 Posner, 68 U Chi L Rev at 1158 (cited in note 25).
37 Posner argues that a cost-benefit analysis can directly convey information
through its contents or can serve as a signal to the president of the agency's priorities if
it is costly to produce. See id at 1160. Of course, given the scarcity of agency rule-making
budgets, the mere pursuance of one rule rather than another signals priority. Reducing
rule-making budgets would have the same effects as a costly analytic requirement: both
force agencies to focus on a smaller set of rules.
38 See Alan B. Morrison, OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong
Way to Write a Regulation, 99 Harv L Rev 1059, 1066 (1985) (lamenting "vast ... re-
sources spent in justifying proposed regulations to OMB").
39 Cooper and West, 50 J Polit at 872 (cited in note 12).
40 See DeMuth and Ginsburg, 99 Harv L Rev at 1082 (cited in note 24) (arguing
that the cost-benefit standard and presidential preferences "will usually be complemen-
tary in practice").
41 Whether increasing OIRA's power facilitates presidential control is a separate
question. See Nicholas Bagley and Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regu-
latory State, 106 Colum L Rev 1260, 1307-12 (2006) (discussing the relationships be-
tween the president, OIRA, and agencies).
42 See James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They
Do It 237 (Basic Books 1989) ("No agency is free to ignore the views of Congress. An
agency may, however, defer to the views of one part of Congress."). See also Bruce
Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 Harv L Rev 633, 702-05 (2000) (describ-
ing fractured oversight of agencies); Thomas H. Hammond and Jack H. Knott, Who Con-
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The informational advantages that agencies have with re-
spect to regulation generally also apply to cost-benefit analysis.
Fears that agencies will manipulate cost-benefit analysis to
promote their agendas 43 mimic similar concerns with respect to
agency science. 44 For example, Professors Matthew Adler and
Eric Posner note that agencies may depart from textbook cost-
benefit-analysis methodology, allowing them to use cost-benefit
analysis to "rationalize decisions made on other grounds. 45 As
early as 1985, commentators worried that agencies could ma-
nipulate the alternatives analyzed to generate preferred re-
sults.46 The concern runs in the other direction as well: for ex-
ample, former Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) Administrator Frank White has written that OIRA used
the existence of methodological controversies to impose its policy
preferences on agencies.47
Agencies' ability to avoid review has also received attention.
Agencies have considerable discretion over the form that policy
making takes, 48 which could be used to thwart review. For ex-
ample, rather than engage in a rule making (which is subject to
review) an agency could shift enforcement priorities to achieve
the same ends. Professor Jennifer Nou examines mechanisms
that agencies can use to hamper OIRA review, such as submit-
ting incomplete cost-benefit analyses or opting for guidance doc-
trols the Bureaucracy? Presidential Power, Congressional Dominance, Legal Constraints,
and Bureaucratic Autonomy in a Model of Multi-institutional Policy-Making, 12 J L,
Econ & Org 119, 140-42 (1996) (presenting a model for agency autonomy when faced
with multiple principals).
43 See, for example, Robert Haveman, The Chicago O'Hare Expansion: A Case
Study of Administrative Manipulation of Benefit-Cost Principles, 23 Rsrch L & Econ 183,
184-86 (2007).
44 See, for example, Wagner, 95 Colum L Rev at 1644-45 (cited in note 16) (discuss-
ing concerns that agencies "introduce science only after the fact in order to scientifically
justify the predetermined standard").
45 Matthew D. Adler and Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 Yale
L J 165, 172 (1999).
46 See, for example, J. Lon Carlson, John B. Braden, and David W. Martin, Implica-
tions of Executive Order 12,291 for Discretion in Environmental Regulation, 12 BC Envir
Affairs L Rev 313, 315 (1985) (expressing concern that agencies had overly broad discre-
tion in implementing the Reagan order).
47 Mark E. Solomons, et al, Agency Diplomacy: Relations with Congress and the
White House, and Ethics in the Administrative Process, 4 Admin L J 3, 25 (1990) (com-
ments of Frank White).
48 See M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U Chi L Rev
1383, 1386-90 (2004).
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uments, rather than rule makings, to achieve policy goals.49 On
the basis of interviews and a partial empirical analysis concern-
ing the later recharacterization of rules as "significant," a recent
student note concludes that agencies are, to some degree or an-
other, manipulating the significance threshold to avoid OIRA's
scrutiny.5O
Attempts to avoid review are, at best, only partially success-
ful, and OIRA remains a powerful force. Many former govern-
ment officials have argued that OIRA regularly influences agen-
cy decision making.51 The most extensive evidence of agency
personnel's perspective on OIRA review was gathered by Profes-
sors Lisa Schultz Bressman and Michael P. Vandenbergh.52 On
the basis of interviews with presidential appointees at EPA, the
authors conclude that OIRA "exerts substantial influence on
day-to-day issues."63 Quantitative analysis has come to similar
49 Jennifer Nou, Agency Self-Insulation under Presidential Review, 126 Harv L Rev
1755, 1782-84, 1793-96 (2013).
50 Note, OIRA Avoidance, 124 Harv L Rev 994, 1007-09 (2011). For a similar effort
examining agency use of guidance documents, see Connor Raso, Do Agencies Use Guid-
ance Documents to Avoid Presidential Control? 3-7 (American Bar Association, Gelhorn-
Sargentich Law Student Essay Competition 2009), online at http://www.americanbar.org
/content/dam/aba/migrated/adminlaw/awardsprogram/ConnorRasoGSEssayWinner.
authcheckdam.pdf (visited May 15, 2014).
51 See E. Donald Elliott, TQM-ing OMB: Or Why Regulatory Review under Execu-
tive Order 12,291 Works Poorly and What President Clinton Should Do about It, 57 L &
Contemp Probs 167, 171-74 (Spring 1994) (recounting OIRA influence over rule making
based on his time as EPA general counsel); Richard L. Revesz and Michael A. Livermore,
Retaking Rationality 26, 28 (Oxford 2008) (citing John Daniel, chief of staff to the EPA
Administrator under President Reagan, and James Tozzi, a career staffer at OMB who
served during several presidential administrations); Donald R. Arbuckle, OIRA and
Presidential Regulatory Review: A View from Inside the Administrative State, *66-73
(unpublished manuscript, May 2008), online at http://works.bepress.com/donaldarbucklell
(visited May 15, 2014) (depicting OIRA review as competently facilitating presidential
oversight and interagency coordination); William F. West, The Institutionalization of
Regulatory Review: Organizational Stability and Responsive Competence at OIRA, 35
Pres Stud Q 76, 86-91 (2005) (same). Justice Elena Kagan has argued that, based on her
experience in the Clinton administration, the White House is able to exert substantial
influence over agency decision making, in part through OIRA review. See Kagan, 114
Harv L Rev at 2246-52 (cited in note 23). Reflecting on his time as OIRA Administrator
during the George W. Bush presidency, Professor John Graham has offered examples in
which OIRA was influential in promoting stronger regulation. See Graham, 157 U Pa L
Rev at 460 & nn 288-89 (cited in note 24).
52 See Lisa Schultz Bressman and Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administra-
tive State: A Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 Mich L Rev 47, 62-
64 (2006). See also Katzen, 105 Mich L Rev at 1498 (cited in note 32) (responding to
Bressman and Vandenbergh).
53 Bressman and Vandenbergh, 105 Mich L Rev at 69 (cited in note 52).
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conclusions concerning the efficacy of regulatory review.54 Most
prominently, Professor Steven Croley's quantitative analysis of
the OIRA review process during the period of 1981 to 2000 simi-
larly found that OIRA does influence many rules, although any
correlation between interest group influence and outcomes was
not clear.55
The manipulation of individual regulatory-impact analyses
is somewhat different from the question that will occupy the
balance of this Article, which has to do with cost-benefit-analysis
methodology more generally. Whether a particular regulatory
alternative was identified and analyzed during a single rule-
making process, for example, may have important consequences
for the rule at hand, but it is unlikely to have a lasting influ-
ence. Cost-benefit-analysis methodologies are applied beyond a
single rule and cover questions that are repeatedly presented to
agencies, such as how to value mortality-risk reductions. To the
extent that agencies influence these methodologies, they will be
able to affect rules even when OIRA is able to insist on rigorous
application of cost-benefit analysis.
C. The Safe-Harbor Effect
While cost-benefit analysis is often assumed to facilitate
OIRA control over agencies, there is an important way in which
the methodology also constrains regulatory review. The exist-
ence of a substantive standard limits the types of issues that can
legitimately be raised by reviewers and reduces the potential for
54 A 2003 review by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) examined rules
reviewed by OIRA in 2001 and 2002, finding that of seventy-one rules that were
"changed" during the process of review, seventeen of them had been significantly altered.
See Curtis W. Copeland, The Role of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in
Federal Rulemaking, 33 Fordham Urban L J 1257, 1282 (2006) (discussing the GAO re-
port).
55 See Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical In-
vestigation, 70 U Chi L Rev 821, 873-75 (2003). Follow-up research to the Croley analy-
sis using more recent data has largely confirmed his findings, though it sometimes draws
different conclusions about the role of interest groups. See Rena Steinzor, Michael Pato-
ka, and James Goodwin, Behind Closed Doors at the White House: How Politics Trumps
Protection of Public Health, Worker Safety, and the Environment 15 (Center for Progres-
sive Reform White Paper No 111ES, Nov 2011), online at http://www.progressivereform.org
/articles/OIRAMeetings-lllles.pdf (visited May 15, 2014) (arguing that OIRA's con-
tacts with regulated entities compromises neutrality); Tiberiu Dragu, Presidential Rule-
making: An Empirical Analysis *2 (unpublished manuscript, Sept 2011), online at
http://www.thecre.com/pdf/20111206_PresidentialRulemaking-emprical.pdf (visited
May 15, 2014) (finding that presidents tend to affect rule makings to a greater extent
later in their administrations).
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arbitrary interference in agency decision making. Because any
concerns that OIRA may have with a regulation must be chan-
neled into the language of cost-benefit analysis, the syntax and
semantics of this language act as a limit on OIRA's power.
Of course, if cost-benefit analysis were infinitely flexible or
were applied in an entirely ad hoc fashion, then this limit would
not be meaningful. But that is not how the methodology of cost-
benefit analysis has evolved. In fact, cost-benefit analysis has
become a relatively standardized methodology that is applied in
a consistent fashion over the course of many rule makings. 56
This system of regularization has come about to facilitate
the smooth functioning of the regulatory-review process. Some
amount of conflict between agencies and OIRA is an inevitable
consequence of the system of regulatory review. If OIRA always
simply deferred to agencies or agencies and OIRA shared prefer-
ences, there would be no need for the process of review. In reali-
ty, review matters because agencies and OIRA have different
expertise, perspectives, and information. This diversity may
help improve regulatory outcomes, but it also leads to interinsti-
tutional disagreement.
Resolving these disputes is not always easy. 57 OIRA is
granted substantial authority under the governing executive or-
ders, but agencies are not placed in a subordinate role. A simple
decision rule giving authority to OIRA to make methodological
choices would require a substantial increase in OIRA's analytic
capacity (in the face of potential opposition from Congress 58 and
the prospect of agency resistance backed by claims of greater ex-
pertise). Because it is not agencies' job to simply execute march-
ing orders from OIRA, disagreements must work their way up
through internal bureaucratic channels. Disputes are referred
up until, ultimately, the OIRA Administrator and political offi-
cials at the agency must attempt to resolve the conflict. If they
cannot, direction from senior White House leadership is neces-
sary: a costly, time-consuming, and generally undesirable out-
56 See Part III for a discussion of the slow evolution of cost-benefit-analysis meth-
odologies.
57 See Cass R. Sunstein, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths
and Realities, 126 Harv L Rev 1838, 1856-58 (2013) (describing process of "elevation"
when controversies between agencies and OIRA cannot be resolved at the staff level).
58 See Part IV.C.
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come. 59 All parties have the incentive to attempt to resolve dis-
putes without seeking such outside mediation.
Cost-benefit analysis helps avoid and resolve these disputes
by establishing a standard set of norms that agencies and OIRA
can apply to specific rule makings. As these norms are elaborat-
ed over time, they structure the rule-making proposals made by
agencies and how OIRA review is carried out. In the course of
this elaboration, new issues will arise, leading to the potential
for further disputes. But once those disagreements are settled,
inertia is likely to set in. Given the many pressing demands
faced by agencies and OIRA, and the need to avoid constant
seeking of direction from political leadership, risk-averse and re-
source-conscious managers are likely to frown on attempts to
raise issues that have already been dealt with in the past. If a
prior decision can be cited as controlling the current matter, in-
ternal bureaucratic forces are likely to encourage that it govern,
absent a compelling reason to revisit the matter. 60
The regularization of cost-benefit analysis creates, in es-
sence, a safe harbor for rules that are cost-benefit justified ac-
cording to already-standardized analytic practices.61 Of course,
this safe harbor is relevant only because of the existence of regu-
latory review. If OIRA review were eliminated, then no safe
harbor would be necessary. But compared to a baseline in which
OIRA review was applied in a standardless fashion, the exist-
ence of cost-benefit analysis helps cabin the exercise of review
authority.62
59 During the Clinton years, the provision in the executive order granting the pres-
ident the power to settle disputes between an agency and OIRA was used only once. See
Kagan, 114 Harv L Rev at 2289 n 174 (cited in note 23).
60 Precedent plays a resource-conserving function in courts. See Benjamin N.
Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 149 (Yale 1921) ("[T]he labor of judges would
be increased almost to the breaking point if every past decision could be reopened in eve-
ry case."). See also Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v Casey, 505 US
833, 854 (1992) ("[N]o judicial system could do society's work if it eyed each issue afresh
in every case that raised it.").
61 See Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 Colum L Rev
1163, 1203-14 (2013) (discussing the role of convention to limit the president's power to
direct agencies).
62 Perhaps the most well-known example of analysis altering an administration's
position was the lead phase-out rule during the Reagan administration, in which cost-
benefit analysis was credited with saving EPA's preferred rule. See generally Albert L.
Nichols, Lead in Gasoline, in Richard D. Morgenstern, ed, Economic Analyses at EPA:
Assessing Regulatory Impact 49 (Resources for the Future 1997) (providing a detailed
account of the role of analysis in lead phase-out). Reflecting on his tenure at OIRA, John
Graham describes instances in which agency cost-benefit analyses were used to help pro-
tective regulation survive political opposition from within the George W. Bush White
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This safe harbor will be particularly powerful when there
are long-established practices that provide guidance. When
methodologies are less standardized, rule makings are more ex-
posed during the process of review. One recent example is an
EPA rule making on coal combustion waste. The cost-benefit
analysis of that rule turned on the resolution of a novel method-
ology concerning the behavioral-economics effects of the rule on
consumer markets for goods containing recycled coal ash.63 Us-
ing the agency's preferred method, the strongest proposed alter-
native was best justified.64 But the rule has since floundered,
perhaps because the agency did not have a substantial body of
research to support its position.65 This outcome can be contrast-
ed with other rules, of equal or greater economic significance, for
which EPA was able to rely on established methodologies and
ultimately pass review.66
By defining the contours of the safe harbor through method-
ological development, agencies can expand the protection offered
by cost-benefit analysis during the process of review. Agencies,
and especially EPA, have devoted considerable time and effort to
developing cost-benefit analysis. That effort is worthwhile even
if cost-benefit analysis is not dispositive67 and other considera-
House, including rules to reduce diesel engine exhaust and interstate air pollution and
increase fuel efficiency. See Graham, 157 U Pa L Rev at 466-69, 472-81 (cited in note
24).
63 Environmental Protection Agency, Hazardous and Solid Waste Management Sys-
tem; Identification and Listing of Special Wastes; Disposal of Coal Combustion Residuals
from Electric Utilities, 75 Fed Reg 35128, 35211-18 (June 21, 2010) (discussing costs and
benefits of the proposed rule and potential for a "stigma" effect to reduce beneficial use of
coal ash).
64 Id.
65 Michael Patoka, Ash Time Goes By: Administration Continues Foot-Dragging on
Coal Ash Rule as Toxic Landfills and Ash Ponds Grow by 94 Million Tons Each Year,
CPRBlog (Center for Progressive Reform July 24, 2013), online at http://progressivereform.org
/CPRBlog.cfm?idBlog=109A8444-BFBB-6891-C205C8277C3118ED (visited May 15,
2014) (criticizing the Obama administration for failing to move quickly to adopt coal ash
rule).
66 Compare Environmental Protection Agency, Regulatory Impact Analysis for the
Federal Implementation Plans to Reduce Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter
and Ozone in 27 States; Correction of SIP Approvals for 22 States 1 (2011) (estimating
annual net quantified benefits between $110 billion and $280 billion) and Environmental
Protection Agency, Regulatory Impact Analysis for the Final Mercury and Air Toxics
Standards 8-2 table 8-1 (2011) (estimating annual net quantified benefits between $27
billion and $80 billion), with Environmental Protection Agency, Regulatory Impact Anal-
ysis: Final National Ambient Air Quality Standard for Ozone 10 figure S1.4 (2011)
(showing potential for costs to exceed benefits).
67 It is to be expected that, at least frequently, when "an administration's political
preferences conflict with economic analysis, analysis loses." Stuart Shapiro, Unequal
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tions play a role. So long as cost-benefit analysis is a factor,
agencies will rationally devote resources to methodological de-
velopment. As long as the harbor functions most of the time, al-
lowing for only the occasional errant wave, agencies will have
incentives to invest in building it out.
The following two Parts describe why agencies are well posi-
tioned to influence cost-benefit-analysis methodology and exam-
ine specific methodological issues in which agencies have had
considerable success in shaping how cost-benefit analysis is car-
ried out.
II. EPA'S ADVANTAGES
Over the past several decades, agencies have played a major
role in shaping the methodology of cost-benefit analysis. Part III
will examine specific areas in which EPA has had success in in-
fluencing cost-benefit-analysis methodology. This Part will dis-
cuss some of the sources of that agency's influence over cost-
benefit analysis, focusing on three areas: Section A discusses the
agency's greater economics capacity, Section B examines the
agency's ability to fund outside research, and Section C reviews
the agency's substantial information advantages during the
rule-development process.
EPA, whose rules make up a large share of OIRA's docket, is
particularly relevant, but other agencies have also invested in
substantial economics capacity, and their efforts are likely to
have had effects on cost-benefit-analysis methodology. The De-
partment of Transportation, in particular, stands out as an
agency that is often subjected to OIRA review and has a long
practice of robust cost-benefit analysis in support of its rule ma-
kings.68 But EPA may be a special case, and the final Section
discusses factors that distinguish EPA from many other agen-
cies. Even if EPA is special, its success is important in its own
right and indicates, at the very least, the potential for other
Partners: Cost-Benefit Analysis and Executive Review of Regulations, 35 Envir L Rptr
10433, 10439 (2005).
68 See W. Norton Grubb, Dale Whittington, and Michael Humphries, The Ambigui-
ties of Benefit-Cost Analysis: An Evaluation of Regulatory Impact Analyses under Execu-
tive Order 12291, in V. Kerry Smith, ed, Environmental Policy under Reagan's Executive
Order: The Role of Benefit-Cost Analysis 121, 131 (North Carolina 1984) (noting the DOT
and EPA both had adopted cost-benefit-analysis guidelines); Viscusi and Aldy, 27 J Risk
& Uncertainty at 54 (cited in note 6) (stating that the DOT "was a leader in valuing mor-
tality risk reductions").
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agencies to influence cost-benefit analysis and therefore the na-
ture of regulatory review.69
A. Economics Capacity
In part as a response to the cost-benefit-analysis require-
ment and OIRA review, EPA has made substantial investments
in building its environmental-economics capacity.70 Economists
directly employed by the agency conduct internal research and
analysis on a range of questions-from how firms respond to en-
vironmental mandates to the risk preferences of Americans-
and continually engage with the peer reviewed economics litera-
ture as contributors, consumers, and funders. A sophisticated
layer of consultants has sprouted up around the agency, re-
sponding to a continual flow of demand for research and analy-
sis, especially in support of individual rule makings. A large ca-
dre of academics in the field of environmental economics has
been supported by the agency, both directly (in the form of re-
search grants) and indirectly (by providing career opportunities
for graduating students and a constant stream of data and re-
search questions with important public policy implications).
It is easy to lose sight of EPA's capacity in environmental
economics because the agency is so large, and economics makes
up a relatively small portion of what the agency does. In his ex-
tensive study of economic analysis at EPA, Richard Morgenstern
characterizes EPA's culture as "a legal culture, buttressed, in
large part, by scientific considerations and, to a far lesser extent,
by economic factors."71 EPA has over seventeen thousand em-
ployees;72 according to the agency's website, "more than half are
69 Agency influence may not always point in the same direction. Viscusi and Aldy,
27 J Risk & Uncertainty at 54 (cited in note 6) (noting that DOT's estimates of the value
of mortality risks "ha[ve] continued to lag behind the estimates in the literature" per-
haps because of an "anchoring effect" associated with "an era in which the present value
of lost earnings was the dominant approach").
70 See Grubb, Whittington, and Humphries, Ambiguities of Benefit-Cost Analysis at
145-54 (cited in note 68) (surveying and evaluating steps taken by EPA in response to
the Reagan order); Matthew C. Stephenson, Bureaucratic Decision Costs and Endoge-
nous Agency Expertise, 23 J L, Econ & Org 469, 476-77 (2007) (discussing how manipu-
lation of "enactment cost" for agencies can produce incentives to invest in expertise).
71 Richard D. Morgenstern, The Legal and Institutional Setting for Economic Anal-
ysis at EPA, in Morgenstern, ed, Economic Analyses at EPA 5, 12 (cited in note 62).
72 Environmental Protection Agency, FY2012 EPA Budget in Brief 11 (2011).
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engineers, scientists, and policy analysts. 73 Of the employees
with graduate degrees, the most commonly held degrees are in
law, engineering, and the sciences, with economics degrees mak-
ing up only around 2 percent of the degrees held.74
Compared to other disciplines at the agency, then, econo-
mists are relatively scarce, but in absolute terms, "there are
probably more economists working on environmental issues em-
ployed at the EPA than at any other single institution in the
world."75 Estimates of personnel actively engaged in environ-
mental economics at the agency range from 89 to 120.76 By way
of comparison, OIRA employs a total of around fifty staff mem-
bers, many of whom are not economists. 77 The largest percentage
of EPA economists is located within the Office of the Adminis-
trator, which includes the Office of Policy 78 and which plays a
major role in EPA rule making.79 EPA's policy office has been
characterized as a "mini-OMB" within the agency.80
The National Center for Environmental Economics (NCEE)
in the Office of Policy is staffed with dozens of economists and is
73 Environmental Protection Agency, How Many People Work for the EPA?, online
at http://publicaccess.supportportal.comlink/portal/23002/23012/Article/l7588/How-many
-people-work-for-the-EPA (visited May 15, 2014).
74 Morgenstern, Legal and Institutional Setting for Economic Analysis at 15 table 2
(cited in note 71).
75 Id at 14.
76 The National Center for Environmental Economics (NCEE) used job classifica-
tions to estimate that EPA employed eighty-nine economists in 2009. NCEE, Number of
EPA Economists in 2009 (on file with author). The estimate of 120 is from an internal
EPA "Economics Forum" list, "which is a group of EPA staff having inter-
est/responsibility for economic work." Email from Brett Snyder to J. Scott Holladay (July
14, 2011) (on file with author). This number comports with a 1996 figure reported by
Morgenstern of 116 EPA employees with economics graduate degrees. Morgenstern, Le-
gal and Institutional Setting for Economic Analysis at 15 table 2 (cited in note 71). Some
individuals with economics graduate degrees may be engaged in budget creation that is
not related to environmental economics, while some with a noneconomic graduate de-
gree, such as a Master of Public Policy, may be heavily involved with environmental-
economics-related research or analysis. See Email from Snyder to Holladay (cited in note
76).
77 See OIRA, Frequently Asked Questions, online at http://www.reginfo.gov
/public/jsp/Utilities/faq.jsp (visited May 15, 2014).
78 Email from Snyder to Holladay (cited in note 76). The Office of Air and Radiation
also employs a substantial number of economists, with the other program offices (such as
the Office of Water) employing a smaller number. Id.
79 See Thomas 0. McGarity, Reinventing Rationality: The Role of Regulatory Analy-
sis in the Federal Bureaucracy 256-61 (Cambridge 1991) (discussing the influence of the
policy office over the course of several administrators).
80 Id at 256.
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the clearinghouse for economics within the agency.8' It carries
out a number of economics-related duties, including consulting
with other offices on analytical questions, conducting research
on a wide range of environmental-economics questions, prepar-
ing and updating agency-wide guidance on cost-benefit analysis,
funding external research, and serving as a training ground for
economists who go on to take other positions within the agency
and the federal government.8 2 It is the culmination of efforts, be-
gun in 1983 (not long after the Reagan order was issued), to con-
solidate economic activities under the policy office so that it
could play a greater role in regulatory-impact analysis8 3
Economists at program offices also play important roles s4
The program offices bear most of the burden of preparing regu-
latory-impact analyses for individual rules-in which the theory
of cost-benefit analysis intersects with practical reality. Econo-
mists within the program offices work directly on those analyses
and supervise the work of outside consultants. They also engage
in research on crosscutting economic questionss5 and have taken
the lead on developing best-practice handbooks and guidance on
economic issues of particular concern to their topic area. 86
Outside consultants are also extremely important. They
take on a substantial portion of the economics workload at EPA,
especially in the preparation of regulatory-impact analyses. To
81 NCEE was created during an internal reorganization of the agency's economics
personnel in 2000. Predecessors of the current organization stretch back almost to the
origins of EPA. See NCEE, Organization and History, online at http://yosemite.epa.gov
/ee/epaleed.nsf/webpages/Organization.html (visited May 15, 2014). These include the
Benefits Branch, which existed within what was then the Office of Policy, Planning and
Evaluation in the mid-1980s and the Implementation Research Division at the Office of
Research and Development in the early 1970s. Id. As of this writing, there were twenty-
eight economists at NCEE. NCEE, Staff Profiles, online at http://yosemite.epa.gov
/ee/epaleed.nsf/webpages/Staff.html (visited May 15, 2014).
82 See NCEE, Alumni - Former NCEE Staff, online at http://yosemite.epa.gov
/ee/epaleed.nsf/87f47db4cfc956d7852575a6006ab365/c0167733a3872e3d852576a2007643
fe!OpenDocument (visited May 15, 2014).
83 See Alan Carlin, Appendix 1: History of Economic Research at the EPA, in Robert
C. Anderson and Paul Kobrin, Introduction to Environmental Economics Research at
EPA (Environmental Protection Agency Aug 2006), online at http://yosemite.epa.gov
/EE/epa/eed.nsf/dcee735e22c76aef85257662005f41l6/2f68aa9ffb75364b8525779700781a2
4!OpenDocument (visited May 21, 2014) (noting move of economics research program
from EPA's Office of Research and Development to the Office Policy, Planning and Eval-
uation to respond to demands of Reagan order).
84 See Environmental Protection Agency, Economics & Cost Analysis Support,
online at http://www.epa.gov/ttnecasl/index.html (visited May 15, 2014).
85 See generally, for example, Bryan J. Hubbell, Implementing QALYs in the Analy-
sis of Air Pollution Regulations, 34 Envir & Res Econ 365 (2006).
86 See Part III.A.
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give a sense of the scale, of the sixty-five regulatory analyses
prepared between 1995 and 1996, consultants were employed on
over 85 percent.87 Between 1985 and 1986, they were employed
on over 90 percent of the analyses.88
The agency has created a peer review system dedicated to
economic questions through a standing committee of the Science
Advisory Board. The Environmental Economics Advisory Com-
mittee was established in 199089 and has included a large num-
ber of leading scholars in the field. Since its inception, it has
provided peer review support and advice for EPA's economics ef-
forts on a large number of topics, including discount rates, 90
multiple valuation techniques,91 best practices,92 and retrospec-
tive review. 93
B. Support for Research
In President Richard Nixon's executive order creating the
Environmental Protection Agency, the two primary "roles and
functions" given to EPA were "[t]he establishment and enforce-
ment of environmental protection standards" and "[t]he conduct
of research on the adverse effects of pollution and on methods
and equipment for controlling it." 94 From the beginning, that re-
search mission has included economic questions: within a year of
its creation, EPA had funded research examining the relation-
ship between property values and air pollution in Chicago 95 and
87 This estimate is based on the information contained in the Environmental Eco-
nomics Report Inventory and was compiled by Chris Anderson. NCEE, Environmental
Economics Reports Inventory Database, online at http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa
/eed.nsf/webpages/EnvironmentalEconomicsReports.html (visited May 15, 2013)
("EERI").
88 See id.
89 Sheila M. Cavanagh, Robert H. Hahn, and Robert N. Stavins, National Envi-
ronmental Policy during the Clinton Years 8 n 11 (Resources for the Future Discussion
Paper No 01-38, Sept 2001).
90 See, for example, EPA Science Advisory Board, Letter to EPA Administrator Lisa
P. Jackson 11-14 (Sept 24, 2009) (discussing perspectives on discounting).
91 See, for example, EPA Science Advisory Board, Valuing the Protection of Ecologi-
cal Systems and Services 43-57 (2009) (advising EPA on valuation techniques).
92 See, for example, EPA Science Advisory Board, Letter to EPA Administrator
Stephen L. Johnson 8-13 (Aug 22, 2006) (reviewing practices used to draft guidance for
Regulatory Environmental Models).
93 See, for example, EPA Science Advisory Board, Letter to EPA Administrator
Carol M. Browner 59-61 (March 30, 1995) (analyzing review procedures).
94 Reorganization Plan No 3 of 1970, in 2 Environmental Statutes 1582, 1588 (Gov-
ernment Institutes 2008).
95 See generally Thomas D. Crocker, Urban Air Pollution Damage Functions: Theo-
ry and Measurement (1971).
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a study examining how willingness to pay for improved water
quality varied with income in Boston.96
NCEE has compiled databases of environmental-economics-
research reports carried out or funded by EPA. The largest re-
pository of research not directly related to regulatory-impact
analyses is the Environmental Economics Report Inventory,
which currently stands at over 660 reports prepared between
1971 and 2011. 97 The research included in this database covers
both empirical and theoretical analysis addressing a wide varie-
ty of issues, from tax subsidies and investment behavior in pol-
luting industries (1997)98 and the income-distribution effects of
pollution control (1973)99 to the economic effects of acidification
on fishing (1985). l°° EPA offices carried out some of this research
directly-about one hundred entries in the database-but most
was conducted by outside actors, either independent consultants
or academics.101
The NCEE Environmental Economics Report Inventory is
augmented by a separate database of research funded by EPA's
Office of Research and Development and its partners, most no-
tably the National Science Foundation (NSF). The NSF/EPA
Funding for Environmental Economics database includes more
than 150 additional research projects funded in the period 1991
to 2004.102 These projects covered a wide range of topics, from
monetary estimates of the value of avoided infant exposure to
96 See generally Marc J. Roberts, A Study of the Measurement and Distribution of
Costs and Benefits of Water Pollution Control (1971).
97 See EERI (cited in note 87). This database is not complete and is missing reports
from certain years. See also Alan Carlin, Preface, in Robert C. Anderson and Paul Ko-
brin, Regulatory Economic Analysis at the EPA (NCEE June 2000), online at
http://yosemitel.epa.gov/ee/epa/eed.nsf/2602a2edfc22e38a8525766200639dfO/002f723d6l
89d45e852577f800072d66!OpenDocument (visited May 21, 2014).
98 See generally Abt Associates, A Profile of Tax Subsidies and Investment Behavior
in Six Major Polluting Industries (1997).
99 See generally Nancy S. Dorfman and Arthur Snow, Who Bears the Cost of Pollu-
tion Control? The Impact on the Distribution of Income of Financing Federally Required
Pollution Control (National Technical Information Service 1973).
100 See generally Daniel M. Violette, A Model Estimating the Economic Impacts of
Current Levels of Acidification on Recreational Fishing in the Adirondack Mountains
(BiblioGov 1985).
101 See EERI (cited in note 87) (sorted by "Research Organization"), online at
http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eerm.nsf/vwFKR?OpenView&Start= l&Count=100&Restri
ctToCategory=E (visited May 15, 2014).
102 See NCEE, Research Funding, online at http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eed.nsf
IWebpages/ResearchFunding.html (visited May 15, 2014) ("NSF/EPA Database').
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nitrates in drinking water 0 3 to the effect of certain air-pollution
requirements on employer/employee relationships.104
Additional economic research carried out or funded by
NCEE is collected in a working-paper series that has run from
2001 and covers staff research on such topics as property value
and underground storage tankslo5 and the effect of latency on
willingness to pay to avoid mortality risk.106 As of mid-2012,
there were roughly one hundred research projects published as
working papers. Economics research is also carried out by the
program offices in relation to specific regulatory-impact anal-
yses. 07
Resources to fund external economics research during the
past several decades have fluctuated between several hundred
thousand dollars up to $4 million per year.'0 8 This represents a
very small portion of EPA's overall budget, and even of the
agency's research budget.109 But compared to OIRA's research
103 See John Loomis, et al, A Comparison of Actual and Hypothetical Willingness to
Pay of Parents and Non-parents for Protecting Infant Health: The Case of Nitrates in
Drinking Water, 41 J Ag & Applied Econ 697, 710 (2009).
104 See generally Gordon Scott Bonham, Economic and Social Impact of Employees
Commute Requirements of the Federal Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 (1993), online
at http:/lyosemite.epa.govee/epa/eed.nsf/41565cd88a5abla3852575a606ab35e/ffb36a83
831bd004852575a7005e9357!OpenDocument (visited May 15, 2014).
105 See generally Dennis Guignet, What Do Property Values Really Tell Us? A He-
donic Study of Underground Storage Tanks, 81 Land Econ 211 (2013).
106 See generally Anna Alberini, et al, Willingness to Pay for Mortality Risk Reduc-
tions: Does Latency Matter?, 32 J Risk & Uncertainty 231 (2006).
107 These are included in a different database. See NCEE, Regulatory Economic
Analyses Inventory, online at http://yosemite1.epa.gov/ee/epa/eed.nsf/webpages
[RegulatorylmpactAnalyses.html (visited May 15, 2014) ("REAl"). See also Anderson and
Kobrin, Regulatory Economic Analysis at the EPA § 5 (cited in note 97), online at
http://yosemitel.epa.gov/ee/epa/eed.nsf/dcee735e22c76aef85257662005f4116/4d65f41594c
b6591852577f800072d4d?OpenDocument (visited May 15, 2014) (providing economic as-
sessments of various water regulations).
108 Carlin, Appendix 1 (cited in note 83) (providing estimates of research dollars
from 1971 to 2009). Nominal funding levels seem to have remained somewhat consistent,
meaning that in real terms, research funding has declined. In the first period in the Car-
lin analysis (1971-75), "[r]esources averaged about $3 million per year." Id. Assuming
that figure has not been indexed for inflation, that would amount to roughly $12.5 mil-
lion in 2011 dollars (adjusted for inflation). See Bureau of Labor Statistics, CPIInflation
Calculator, online at http://www.bls.gov/datalinflationcalculator.htm (visited May 15,
2014) ("BLS Inflation Calculator").
109 EPA's budget has largely fluctuated between $8 billion and $10 billion in 2013
dollars. See EPA's Budget and Spending, online at http://www2.epa.gov/planandbudget
/budget (visited May 15, 2014) (adjusted using BLS Inflation Calculator (cited in note
108)). EPA's proposed budget for "research and innovation" for 2013 was $576 million, of
which $81 million is dedicated to Science to Achieve Results (STAR) grants, which funds
research economics as well as other fields. EPA, News Release, EPA's FY 2013 Budget
Proposal Focuses on Core Environmental and Human Health Protections (Feb 13, 2012),
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budget, which is essentially nil, it is nevertheless significant.11o
Major institutional recipients included academic institutions
with environmental-economics departments, consultants, and
think tanks, especially Resources for the Future.",
The general topics of this research have remained relatively
consistent over the years. The development of tools to assign
monetary values to environmental benefits has likely been the
greatest recipient of research dollars.112 A large number of other
questions occupy a second tier of research concerns, including
the effect of market-incentive approaches, methods for cost es-
timation, and industrial analysis.113 The primary difference over
time has been in the level of detail and sophistication of the
online at http://yosemite.epa.gov/opaladmpress.nsf1324eO40292ele51f85257359003f533a
/d38e604ef465557a852579a3005f4630!OpenDocument (visited May 15, 2014). EPA's
funding for economics research is dwarfed by other federal institutions. For an example
of a much larger institutional research budget, see National Institute of Health, NIH
Awards by Location & Organization, online at http://report.nih.gov/awardindex.cfm (vis-
ited May 15, 2014).
110 The primary offices funding the research were the Office of Policy and Office of
Research and Development. See Alan Carlin, Appendix 1 (cited in note 83). The Office of
Policy has also been known as the Office of Policy, Planning and Evaluation, and the Of-
fice of Policy, Economics and Innovation. Granting programs were consolidated within
NCEE in 2008. Id.
111 See EERI (cited in note 101) (sorted by "Research Organization").
112 See Alan Carlin, Appendix 2: Analysis of the Distribution of Research Reports
Prepared under the EPA Economic Research Program by Subject and Period, 1971-1989,
in Anderson and Kobrin, Environmental Economic Analysis (cited in note 83) (noting a
shift in the period after the Reagan order toward greater research devoted to benefits
quantification and monetization).
113 See id. Compare Resources for the Future, A Program of Economics Research on
Improving Estimation of Benefits from Reduced Pollution vii-viii (February 1981) (iden-
tifying research areas as: improving "econometric-epidemiological methods" aimed at
establishing dose-response relationships for human health and environmental contami-
nation; using market data to identify willingness to pay to avoid morbidity and mortality
risk; improving survey techniques for stated preference studies; and using surveys for
"hard-to-approach categories of benefits" such as visibility and existence value), with
Environmental Protection Agency, Environmental Economics Research Strategy ES-3
(Dec 2005) (identifying research areas as valuation of human health benefits, valuation
of ecological benefits, compliance behavior, market instruments, and benefits of envi-
ronmental-information disclosure).
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questions that are asked"14 and the occasional waxing and wan-
ing of research interest.115
Assessing the totality of the impact of EPA's research agen-
da on the practice of cost-benefit analysis is difficult, but it is
clear that in the long march of progress in building the field of
environmental economics-generating data, perfecting meas-
urement and statistical techniques, and constructing theoretical
foundations-EPA has been a major contributor.116 To give a
very rough-and-ready sense of the relationship between EPA
and leading researchers in the field, of the five economists most
cited in environmental-economics journals, three have at some
point received funds listed in the NSF/EPA Environmental Eco-
nomics Database and the Environmental Economics Research
Inventory.117 The two most cited economists, Richard T. Carson
and Michael W. Hanemann, together received seventeen grants.
Other important figures within the environmental-economics
community who have received substantial research support from
EPA include Thomas D. Crocker (thirty-seven grants or con-
tracts), Maureen L. Cropper (twelve grants or contracts), A. My-
rick Freeman (seven grants or contracts), V. Kerry Smith (twen-
114 Contrast Resources for the Future, A Program of Economics Research at 45-49
(cited in note 113) (identifying elementary methodological questions concerning mortali-
ty and morbidity-risk-reduction valuation), with EPA, Environmental Economics at 3-3
(cited in note 113) (identifying more complex research questions such as the interaction
between mortality-risk value and other variables such as age and health status, the ill-
ness that accompanies mortality risks (such as illness from cancer), and risk characteris-
tics such as voluntariness).
115 For example, topics that were beginning to gain prominence in the early 1980s,
such as the efficacy of trading programs, had by 2005 become major areas of research,
and other issues-behavioral issues around voluntary compliance and the value of envi-
ronmental information-had not yet been conceived. See EPA, Environmental Economics
at 2-6 (cited in note 113).
116 An example of the kind of subtle influence the agency has had on the profession
is support for the environmental economist A. Myrick Freeman III during the period of
time before his publication of The Benefits of Environmental Improvement: Theory and
Practice (Resources for the Future 1979), which would become an important touchstone
that generated research topics for well over a decade. See V. Kerry Smith, Foreword, in
A. Myrick Freeman III, The Measurement of Environmental and Resource Values: Theory
and Methods xiii, xiii-xiv (Resources for the Future 2d ed 2003).
117 Compare Maximilian Auffhammer, The State of Environmental and Resource
Economics: A Google Scholar Perspective, 3 Rev Envir Econ & Pol 251, 262 (2009)
(providing list of most cited authors), with EERI (cited in note 87) (sorted by "Author"),
online at http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eerm.nsflAuthor (visited May 15, 2014);
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ty-three grants or contracts), and W. Kip Viscusi (twenty-six
grants or contracts).118
C. Individual Regulatory-Impact Analyses
Disaggregating the influence of OIRA and EPA in determin-
ing the content of individual regulatory-impact analyses is diffi-
cult. Nevertheless, there can be little doubt that EPA plays some
role in deciding important methodological questions, either be-
cause OIRA does not engage on an issue, because EPA is able to
influence the staff at OIRA, or because the agency is able to
have its decisions respected even in the face of some opposition
from OIRA.
EPA has compiled its regulatory-impact analyses and the
documents supporting those analyses into the Regulatory Eco-
nomic Analyses Inventory. By 2000, when the Environmental
Law Institute was contracted to provide an overview of the da-
tabase, it included over 1,200 documents, of which 320 were
classified as impact analyses.119 These analyses cover the entire
range of regulatory topics within EPA's jurisdiction and include
impact analyses of rules 120 as well as many research reports car-
ried out on particular topics in service of general policy-office
regulatory agendas.121 This massive body of work, covering cost-
benefit analysis in practice, is where many of the methodological
issues around cost-benefit analysis arise and are worked out.
Although it is difficult to know the relative influence of
OIRA and EPA over specific regulatory-impact analyses, EPA
brings many important advantages to the table. First and fore-
most, it is charged with actually conducting the analysis in the
first instance, gathering the relevant data, and selecting alter-
natives. There is an extensive internal procedure that governs
118 EERI (cited in note 117) (sorted by "Author"); NSF/EPA Database (cited in note
117) (sorted by "Investigators"); NCEE, NCEE Working Paper Series (sorted by "Authors'),
online at http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eed.nsf/webpages/WorkingPapersByAuthor.html
(visited May 15, 2014).
119 See Anderson and Kobrin, Regulatory Economic Analysis § 1 (cited in note
107107).
120 See, for example, Environmental Protection Agency, Air Pollutant Emission
Standards and Guidelines for Municipal Waste Combustors: Revision and Update of
Economic Impact Analysis and Regulatory Impact Analysis 4-1 to -13 (Nov 1990).
121 For example, a 1978 report on "air pollutant control techniques for phosphate
rock processing industry" by a contractor in service of the Office of Air Quality Planning
and Standards was part of an effort to facilitate state and local regulation. See David M.
Augenstein, Air Pollutant Control Techniques for Phosphate Rock Processing Industry ii
(National Technical Information Service 1978).
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the internal rule-making process, managed by an interoffice
taskforce, with multiple steps for gathering and analyzing data,
compiling information, and structuring decision making by polit-
ical appointees, all of which culminates in the selection of alter-
natives and, ultimately, the cost-benefit analysis.122 While OIRA
has a role to play in that process, it is relatively thin and rela-
tively late.123 Typically, OIRA does not see the regulatory-impact
analyses until they have been fully drafted, thereby having to
deal with a status quo that can be difficult to reverse. 124
In addition, the sheer resources that EPA can bring to bear
in support of a rule making vastly outstrip OIRA's. EPA has a
team of professionals charged with preparing the regulatory-
impact analysis, often augmented by outside consultants. OIRA
has a single desk officer, or at most a small group within the of-
fice. Some additional information may be available from interest
groups and other agencies and White House offices, but neither
outside groups nor other offices are likely to be intimately famil-
iar with the details of the regulatory-impact analysis.
Of course, OIRA brings important advantages as well, chief
among them the ability to say no, at least for a while.25 But
from the perspective of cognition and information processing,
EPA has substantial advantages.26 On the issue of alternatives
selection, for example, if agency personnel do not include nonob-
vious alternatives in the regulatory-impact analysis, these op-
tions may not become known to OIRA. And even when known
alternatives exist, it is difficult, though not impossible, to force
the agency to consider a major alteration of its initial options
set.127 On the myriad other questions of lower importance, about
122 See Jeffrey S. Lubbers, A Guide to Federal Agency Rulemaking 241-53 (ABA 4th
ed 2006) (outlining the internal rule-making process).
123 See id at 251-53.
124 See id.
125 In some ways, this makes OIRA analogous to courts. See, for example, EME
Homer City Generation v Environmental Protection Agency, 696 F3d 7, 12 (DC Cir 2012)
(reversing the second attempt by EPA to institute emissions trading regime under inter-
state pollution provision of Clean Air Act), revd and remd Environmental Protection
Agency v EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 134 S Ct 1584 (2014).
126 For this reason, OIRA must often rely on outside parties, including regulated in-
dustry, to provide information. See Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, and Barry R.
Weingast, Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and
the Political Control of Agencies, 75 Va L Rev 431, 434 (1989).
127 See Richard D. Morgenstern and Marc K. Landy, Economic Analysis: Benefits,
Costs, Implications, in Morgenstern, ed, Economic Analyses at EPA 455, 473-74 (cited in
note 62) (discussing the problem of economic analysis occurring too late in the rule-
20141
The University of Chicago Law Review
which those outside the agency have even less information and
fewer incentives to interfere in the agency's decision making are
even lower, it seems likely that EPA's discretion over the shape
of individual regulatory-impact analyses is even greater.
D. Is EPA Special?
Before examining how EPA's advantages have translated
into influence over the shape of cost-benefit analysis, it is worth
considering whether and in what ways EPA is different from
other administrative agencies. If EPA is not typical, observa-
tions about how EPA has influenced cost-benefit-analysis meth-
odology will not be universally generalizable. Understanding the
ways in which EPA is special can help establish the limits of the
claims in this Article and clarify the conditions under which
agencies are more or less likely to be able to exert methodologi-
cal influence.
Perhaps most obviously, EPA has extensive rule-making ca-
pacity and experience. Between 1990 and 2010, 328 economical-
ly significant rules proposed by EPA were reviewed by OIRA.128
The only agency with a larger number of economically signifi-
cant rules reviewed was the Department of Health and Human
Services, with 516. The Department of Agriculture had a similar
number of economically significant rules, with 312.129 The only
other agency to break 100 rules was the Department of Trans-
portation, with 187 economically significant rules. 130 EPA's expe-
rience translates into both expertise and opportunity.
The agency also regulates in a highly technical area, so it is
relatively difficult for outsiders to evaluate the agency's judg-
ments on many issues. Professor Thomas McGarity provides a
compellingly mind-boggling list of the various types of technical
expertise that the agency must bring to bear on a single air-
quality rule making, which requires experts in "toxicology, epi-
demiology, and the etiology of lung diseases," "atmospheric
chemistry," "air pollution dispersion modeling," "stationary
source technology," "mobile source technology," "transportation
making process). Regulatory stringency is one major area in which the options can be
obvious and OIRA can have a major impact on the alternatives presented.
128 Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Review Counts, online at
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eoCountsSearchInit?action=init (visited May 15, 2014)
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and urban planning," "economics," "environmental law," "en-
forcement," and "politics."131 With such varied and specialized
technical expertise in play, a habit of deference to agency judg-
ment would be easy to develop.
The agency's political context matters. 132 There is a thick in-
terest group constellation surrounding EPA, with a wide range
of industry actors (often on both sides of a regulatory issue) as
well as relatively well-funded interest groups that promote
stronger environmental regulation. This large number of groups
affected by EPA regulation may give the agency some degree of
latitude to set its own agenda, "secure in the knowledge that
somebody out there is likely to be their ally."133 At the same
time, the agency is likely to face criticism no matter its course of
action, which can drain time and resources, and EPA will be
subject to shifting political direction when elections reshape con-
trol over the White House and Congress.134 Although interest
groups can sometimes hinder the agency, EPA is in a stronger
position to control its own fate than agencies that are captured
by a single client or those that lack organized political support. 35
Furthermore, EPA regulation covers quality-of-life issues, such
as air quality, that affect all US residents. Politicians that op-
pose EPA are justifiability sensitive to being cast in an antienvi-
ronmental light. EPA's authority also touches on matters that,
at least periodically, are raised to the level of high salience with-
in the broader electorate.136
EPA is also different in that, unlike the mandates at some
agencies, there is a strong and widely recognized economic justi-
fication for environmental regulation. It has been known for
decades that pollution is a source of market failure--an appro-
131 Thomas 0. McGarity, The Internal Structure of EPA Rulemaking, 54 L & Con-
temp Probs 57, 60-61 (Autumn 1991).
132 For a pessimistic perspective on how EPA's political context has thwarted the
success of the agency, see Richard J. Lazarus, The Tragedy of Distrust in the Implemen-
tation of Federal Environmental Law, 54 L & Contemp Probs 311, 315-17 (Autumn
1991).
133 Wilson, Bureaucracy at 81 (cited in note 42).
134 Id.
135 Wilson refers to the former as resulting from "client" politics and the latter as
resulting from "entrepreneurial" politics. Id at 76-77.
136 See, for example, Friederike Schultz, et al, Strategic Framing in the BP Crisis: A
Semantic Network Analysis of Associative Frames, 38 Pub Rel Rev 97, 101-03 (2012) (ex-
amining the public relations strategy deployed by BP to reduce reputational harm asso-
ciated with the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill).
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priate target for government intervention. 137 Debates within the
economics community concern not whether environmental regu-
lation is necessary, but rather second-order questions such as
how to value the benefits associated with ecosystem protection.
EPA's position can be compared to agencies such as the Depart-
ment of Labor or the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), in which the economic case for regulation is more highly
contested within the economics profession.138
EPA may also enjoy a special status within associated pro-
fessional communities, including environmental economics, en-
vironmental law, toxicology, and ecology. It is reasonable to hy-
pothesize that there may be a dispositional difference between,
for example, individuals drawn to environmental versus finan-
cial economics. If so, environmental economists may be more fa-
vorably disposed to EPA regulation than financial economists
are toward the SEC, even aside from the strength of the relative
justifications for government intervention. This should not be
overdrawn to imply that environmental professionals regularly
subvert norms of objectivity, rationality, dispassion, and empiri-
cism to forward their subjective ideological whims. But it is a po-
tential feature of EPA's operating environment that is worth
considering.
Finally, EPA has a relatively strong sense of mission com-
pared to many other agencies.139 For a variety of reasons, gov-
ernment institutions often have difficulty establishing the kind
of widely shared and "warmly endorsed" culture that "confers a
feeling of special worth" on bureaucratic work.140 But exceptions
exist, especially when special conditions at an agency's founding
"imprint" characteristics on agency structure and culture that
137 See A.C. Pigou, The Economics of Welfare 159-63 (Macmillan 1920) (developing
the concept of externalities).
138 See Stephen Nickell, Unemployment and Labor Market Rigidities: Europe versus
North America, 11 J Econ Persp 55, 66-67 (Summer 1997) (discussing theories on how
employee protection may result in unemployment and providing empirical analysis with
mixed results); Henry T.C. Hu, Efficient Markets and the Law: A Predictable Past and an
Uncertain Future, 4 Ann Rev Fin Econ 179, 206-07 (2012) (discussing how economic the-
ory interacts with financial regulation).
139 See Wilson, Bureaucracy at 95 (cited in note 42).
140 Id. Difficulties include multiple competing goals, a hothouse political atmos-
phere, and even intentional steps taken by Congress to overload an agency with tasks
while undermining its ability to effectively carry out its work. See Terry Moe, The Poli-
tics of Bureaucratic Structure, in John E. Chubb and Paul E. Peterson, eds, Can the Gov-
ernment Govern? 267, 275-79 (Brookings 1989).
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persist despite potentially adverse subsequent developments.141
When EPA was created, Congress was in the midst of adopting
major bipartisan pieces of legislation that established, in EPA,
expansive powers to remake the economy in a more environmen-
tally friendly direction. This congressional action occurred
against the political backdrop of the second-wave environmental
movement and a broader social and cultural recognition of envi-
ronmental values.142 William Ruckelshaus, the agency's first
administrator, was also a bipartisan and charismatic leader who
was in a position to communicate a clear sense of EPA's mission
to personnel and the broader public.143 The basic circumstances
of EPA's founding were especially favorable to the development
of a clear organizational mission.
All of these factors may combine to produce an agency that
is particularly well positioned to exert influence within the ex-
ecutive branch. EPA's experience may well not represent the
norm in how agencies interact with OIRA or the methodology of
cost-benefit analysis. But the EPA case is important-both in its
own right, given the agency's large regulatory output, and as a
demonstration of the possibilities for agencies in general to in-
fluence cost-benefit-analysis methodology.
III. EPA'S INFLUENCE
The following Sections examine instances in which EPA in-
fluence on the methodology can be traced. Of course, no individ-
ual case is completely clear-cut. It is possible that similar choic-
es would have been made without EPA playing an important
role: there is no counterfactual against which the actual evolu-
tion of the methodology can be compared. But the substantial
agency resources that have been devoted and the relationship
between the final outcomes and the agency's reasonably clear
preferences are highly evocative of substantial influence. Part
III.A discusses EPA's long tradition of establishing cutting-edge,
best-practice guidelines that support the agency's preferred
141 See Christopher Marquis and Andrds Tilcsik, Imprinting: Toward a Multilevel
Theory, 7 Acad Mgmt Annals 195, 200-04 (2013).
142 See Samuel P. Hays, Beauty, Health, and Permanence: Environmental Politics in
the United States, 1955-1985 527-43 (Cambridge 1987) (examining social and political
consequences of second-wave environmental movements).
143 See generally Raanan Lipshitz and Leon Mann, Leadership and Decision Mak-
ing: William R. Ruckelshaus and the Environmental Protection Agency, 11 J Leadership
& Org Stud 41 (2005) (providing history of Ruckelshaus's terms as EPA administrator
and examining his leadership style).
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methodologies and end up being broadly influential within the
executive branch. Parts III.B and III.C discuss specific methodo-
logical issues: first, the value of statistical life; and second, the
contingent valuation technique used to value nonmarket goods.
The final Section discusses instances in which EPA has been
able to influence other agencies or interagency processes con-
cerning valuation of regulatory benefits.
A. Best-Practice Guidelines
Over the past three decades, the methodology of cost-benefit
analysis has evolved considerably. In particular, a revolution in
estimating and valuing regulatory benefits has allowed more
complete and economically meaningful analyses to be conduct-
ed.144 Over the same period, OIRA and agencies have improved
the best-practice guidelines that are used to inform individual
regulatory-impact analyses. These guidelines are meant to con-
tain an updated assessment of the state of the art in cost-
benefit-analysis methodology. Although in individual cases regu-
latory-impact analyses can depart from the recommendations of
the guidelines, they have a very strong anchoring effect. 145
OIRA has issued four separate guidance documents: in
1981,146 1987,147 1996,148 and 2003.149 In addition, the Clinton or-
der that continues to govern regulatory review (signed in 1993)
includes many elements that can be understood as best-practice
guidance. EPA has issued updated guidelines roughly every ten
144 See Richard T. Carson, Contingent Valuation: A Comprehensive Bibliography
and History 3-12 (Elgar 2011).
145 See, for example, Viscusi and Aldy, 27 J Risk & Uncertainty at 54 (cited in note
6) (finding that the Federal Aviation Administration's low value of a statistical life may
reflect an anchoring effect). But see Jerry Ellig, Patrick A. McLaughlin, and John F.
Morrall III, Continuity, Change, and Priorities: The Quality and Use of Regulatory Anal-
ysis across US Administrations, 7 Reg & Governance 153, 154 (2013) (arguing that de-
tailed guidance to agencies has not led to high-quality regulatory analysis).
146 Office of Management and Budget, Interim Regulatory Impact Analysis Guid-
ance, 11 Envir Rptr (BNA) 258 (1981) ("OMB, 1981 Interim Guidance").
147 Office of Management and Budget, Regulatory Impact Analysis Guidance, in
Regulatory Program of the United States Government 561 (OMB 1988) ("OMB, 1987
Guidance").
148 Office of Management and Budget, Economic Analysis of Federal Regulations
under Executive Order 12866 (Jan 11, 1996), online at http://www.whitehouse.gov
/omb/inforeg riaguide (visited May 15, 2014) ("OMB, 1996 Guidance").
149 Office of Management and Budget, Regulatory Analysis, Circular A-4 (Sept 17,
2003).
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years, 150 and other agencies have issued occasional best-practice
guidance of their own.
The development of these guidelines has been an iterative
process in which OIRA tends to issue progressively more de-
tailed guidance, with agencies (and especially EPA) filling in the
many interstices that exist in the interim. There are two im-
portant consequences of this process. First is that the agencies'
more specific guidance governs the wide range of issues left open
by OIRA. Second, when OIRA approaches the drafting of updat-
ed, and more specific, guidelines, the agency documents serve as
an important baseline that anchor discussions and provide sub-
stantive justification for particular methodological choices that
have already been made by agencies. In addition, all of the pri-
mary research and literature reviews done to support the agency
documents are available and agency personnel, consultants, and
even interest groups have come to rely on them. While OIRA is
free to depart from the path that agencies have already chosen,
agency guidelines form part of the "intellectual milieu" sur-
rounding the development of new guidance by OIRA.'5' This is
especially the case when, at least from the 1987 iteration for-
ward, OIRA staff and leadership consulted extensively with
agencies, both formally and informally, when developing new
guidance. For the most recent update of OIRA's guidance in
2003, there was a particularly robust consultation process, with
a formal group convened to provide feedback for OIRA that was
chaired by two agency economists, Al McGartland from EPA and
Randy Lutter from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
The first best-practice guidance on regulatory cost-benefit
analysis for federal agencies was OMB's Interim Regulatory Im-
pact Analysis Guidance, issued in 1981.152 That document was a
page and a half long and provided only the barest outline of how
analysis should be conducted. When guidance was given, there
was little, if any, supporting justification. For example, the dis-
cussion of discounting simply stated that "[a]n annual discount
rate of 10 percent should be used" for costs and benefits, with no
150 See generally Environmental Protection Agency, Guidelines for Performing Regu-
latory Impact Analysis (Dec 1983) ("EPA, 1983 Guidelines") (including both 1983 and
1991 versions); EPA, 2000 Guidelines (cited in note 7); EPA, 2010 Guidelines (cited in
note 4).
151 Telephone interview with John D. Graham, Dean, Indiana University School of
Public and Environmental Affairs (Aug 16, 2012).
152 OMB, 1981 Interim Guidance (cited in note 146).
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further explanation.153 Contemporaneous commentators criti-
cized the Interim Guidance as underspecified, arguing that it
"could not possibly be construed as a substitute for a benefit-cost
manual" and left agencies to "effectively assum[e] OMB's re-
sponsibility in this area."'154
EPA's first set of guidelines, issued shortly thereafter in
1983,15 was substantially longer and previewed several central
methodological debates that would prove to be of continued im-
portance. 156 These included the monetary valuation of public
health benefits, 157 discounting of future costs and benefits, 158 and
the treatment of qualitative costs and benefits 159 and distribu-
tional effects.160 In each of these areas, EPA staked out positions
that it would build support for over the subsequent decades, in
almost all cases seeing its views vindicated in successive itera-
tions of OIRA guidance documents.
153 Id at 259.
154 See Grubb, Whittington, and Humphries, Ambiguities of Benefit-Cost Analysis at
130-31 (cited in note 68).
155 EPA, 1983 Guidelines at M2 (cited in note 150) (stating that it is meant to "help
analysts at [EPA] prepare [regulatory-impact analyses] that satisfy OMB's require-
ments").
156 The main document was sixteen pages long-short by contemporary standards,
but much longer than OIRA's guidance at the time. In addition, there were methodologi-
cal appendices included in the original guidance, which almost immediately went under
revision. Ann Fisher, An Overview and Evaluation of EPA's Guidelines for Conducting
Regulatory Impact Analyses, in Smith, ed, Environmental Policy under Reagan's Execu-
tive Order 99, 100 (cited in note 68).
157 EPA, 1983 Guidelines at M8-M9 (cited in note 150).
158 EPA recommended use of "a lower social rate of discount" and "directly compar-
ing benefits to future generations with costs to the current generation" without discount-
ing as alternatives to standard discounting. Id at M13.
159 EPA's 1983 Guidelines state that "the analysis of benefits should cover the entire
spectrum of benefits, from those that can be assigned a dollar value to those that can on-
ly be described qualitatively." Id at M5. The Guidelines also caution that
[t]he net benefit estimate should be carefully evaluated in light of all the ef-
fects that have been excluded because they could not be assigned a dollar val-
ue. Thus, immediately following a net benefit calculation, all benefits and costs
that can only be quantified, as well as all benefits and costs that can only be
qualitatively described, should be presented and evaluated.
Id at M12 (emphasis added).
160 The 1983 Guidelines state that "regulatory decisions should address distribu-
tional issues" and that "[a]nalysis can reveal the likely distribution of benefits and costs
among groups" but they "cannot determine whether the distribution is equitable or how
distributional issues are to be weighted." Therefore, EPA states that "the [regulatory-
impact analysis] is best viewed as a document that organizes information... while leav-
ing considerable latitude to decision makers in selecting the preferred regulatory ap-
proach." Id at M15-M16.
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Discounting provides a stark example. In its 1981 Interim
Guidance, OMB issued a terse instruction to agencies to use a 10
percent discount rate, along with language allowing "other dis-
count rates ... to test the sensitivity of the results.161 The 10
percent number was likely taken from a 1972 OMB guidance
document on discount rates called Circular A-94.162 Over the
course of the next several years, through its guidance docu-
ments 163 and outside research,164 EPA challenged the validity of
the 10 percent rate and began building the conceptual argument
for lower rates in the environmental context.
In its 1984 Discounting Appendix to its cost-benefit-analysis
guidelines, EPA built a discounting framework that was based
on lower, consumption-based (as opposed to capital-based) rates
of discounting and explicitly recognized the intergenerational
discounting problem. When OMB issued its Regulatory Impact
Analysis Guidance in 1987, it had adopted EPA's approach of
recognizing the difference between the opportunity cost of capi-
tal and the consumption rate of interest, though it maintained
the 10 percent default rate.165 Five years later, OMB substantial-
ly revised the 1972 discounting guidance Circular A-94 and low-
ered the overall discount rate used by the government to 7 per-
cent. 166 When OIRA updated its guidelines again in 1995, after
the Clinton order was adopted, there was a substantial discus-
sion of the disadvantages of a pure opportunity-cost-of-capital
161 OMB, 1981 Interim Guidance at 259 (cited in note 146).
162 Office of Management and Budget, Discount Rates to Be Used in Evaluating
Time-Distributed Costs and Benefits, Circular No A-94 Revised (Mar 27, 1972).
163 EPA issued two updated appendices to its 1983 Guidelines focused specifically on
discounting, one in 1984 and one in 1989. See EPA, 1983 Guidelines at C2, 2 (cited in
note 150). These documents examined and compared multiple discounting methodolo-
gies, introduced the concept of risk and portfolio theory into the discounting discussion
(in support of a lower risk-free rate), and identified a substantial secondary literature in
support of EPA choices. Id at C3-C15, 2-9. The 1989 appendix also clarified and en-
dorsed a specific discounting model to deal with complex time-tradeoff choices when reg-
ulations had effects on both investment and consumption, and even developed a "menu-
driven computer program that can be run on any DOS-based personal computer" to aid
in discounting calculation. Id at 5.
164 See, for example, Resource and Environmental Economics Laboratory at the
University of Wyoming, Regulatory Impact Analysis: Guidance on the Appropriate Rate
of Discount 8-20 (1982).
165 Compare EPA, 1983 Guidelines at C5 (cited in note 150), with OMB, 1987 Guid-
ance at 566 (cited in note 147).
166 Office of Management and Budget, Guidelines and Discount Rates for Benefit-
Cost Analysis of Federal Programs, Circular A-94, 8-12 (Oct 29, 1992) (including a dis-
cussion of best practices for cost-benefit analysis that somewhat tracks the OMB's 1987
guidance).
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approach and of problems posed by intergenerational costs and
benefits 167 that mirrored similar concerns raised earlier by
EPA.168
By 2003, with release of the (currently governing) A-4 Circu-
lar, OMB had gone even further. The A-4 Circular explicitly en-
dorsed use of both a 3 percent and a 7 percent discount rate and
included a substantial discussion of the special problems of in-
tergenerational discounting, noting that economic research sup-
ported use of "the minimum discount rate having any substan-
tial positive probability" over very long time horizons and
recognizing that discount rates as low as 1 percent were poten-
tially "appropriate."169 In essence, by 2003, OIRA had adopted
the discounting approached developed by EPA in 1984.
Qualitative and distributional effects tell a similar story.
Before the Clinton order was adopted, there was an "extensive"
consultation process involving relevant agencies, during which
multiple drafts of the order were distributed for comment and
substantial edits were made.170 The most important methodolog-
ical advances in the Clinton order were the emphasis on "quali-
tative measures"-which the order states may be "difficult to
quantify, but nevertheless essential to consider"171-and the "ex-
pansive and eclectic list of the kinds of benefits that must be
taken into account,"172 which included not only environmental
and public health benefits but also "distributive impacts" and
"equity."173 While both distribution and qualitative impacts were
167 See OMB, 1996 Guidance at Part III.A.3.b (cited in note 148) ("[E]conomic wel-
fare is ultimately determined by consumption; investment affects welfare only to the ex-
tent that it affects current and future consumption."); id at Part III.A.3.c ("intergenera-
tional analysis"). This document also introduced concerns about "relative price changes"
driven by "increasing scarcity of certain environmental resources," an issue that was lat-
er dropped by OMB in the 2003 A-4 Circular, but which economists now argue can be
extremely important for long-time-horizon environmental-economics analysis. Id at Part
III.A.3.a. See also Thomas Sterner and U. Martin Persson, An Even Sterner Review: In-
troducing Relative Prices into the Discounting Debate, 2 Rev Envir Econ & Pol 61, 68
(2008).
168 EPA, 1983 Guidelines at M13 (cited in note 150).
169 OMB, Circular A-4 at 36 (Sept 17, 2003) (cited in note 149).
170 Telephone Interview with Sally Katzen, Visiting Professor, New York University
School of Law (July 12, 2012).
171 Executive Order 12866 at 51735 (cited in note 21).
172 Pildes and Sunstein, 62 U Chi L Rev at 44 (cited in note 27).
173 Executive Order 12866 at 51735 (cited in note 21). Many of the other important
reforms within the order were directed at the procedure of executive review-for exam-
ple by setting formalized deadlines to avoid delay. See id at 51742. Professors Pildes and
Sunstein, writing in 1995, argue that the Clinton order reflected "ambivalence and cau-
tion toward" cost-benefit analysis because "the list of factors that must be included in
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discussed in the Reagan order and subsequent OIRA guidance, 174
the Clinton order places substantially greater emphasis on these
issues, essentially adopting the position taken by EPA in its
1983 Guidelines.175
The guidelines adopted by EPA in 2000176 represented the
first genuinely complete benefit-cost manual, reaching a level of
specificity on a wide range of methodological questions that is
unlikely to be duplicated by any OIRA guidance document in the
foreseeable future. Peer review played an important role in the
development of the 2000 Guidelines, with the agency's Science
Advisory Board Environmental Economics Advisory Committee
"provid[ing] substantial input on the content and organization of
the document [and] reviewing the materials for accuracy in both
economic theory and practice."'177 The overall assessment of re-
viewers was that the Guidelines "succeed[] in reflecting meth-
ods and practices that enjoy widespread acceptance in the envi-
ronmental economics profession."78 When OIRA updated its
this analysis is broadened significantly, with open-ended and potentially ambiguous var-
iables." Pildes and Sunstein, 62 U Chi L Rev at 44 (cited in note 27). For Pildes and Sun-
stein, the ambivalence tracked misgivings within the broader public "rooted in deeper
forces having to do with fundamental questions about the nature of 'rational' choice
among competing policies." Id at 45.
174 The Reagan order states that for descriptions of both costs and benefits, "effects
that cannot be quantified in monetary terms" and "the identification of those likely to
receive [them]" should be included. Executive Order 12291 at 13194 (cited in note 17).
The 1981 Interim Regulatory Impact Analysis Guidance stated that "to whom [benefits]
would accrue" and "who would bear [] cost[s]" should be included in the regulatory-
impact analysis. OMB, 1981 Interim Guidance at 259 (cited in note 146). Similarly, while
the guidance places an emphasis on quantification, it also states that "favorable effects"
and costs that cannot be quantified should be "described." Id.
175 Compare Executive Order 12866 at 51735 (cited in note 21) ("Costs and benefits
shall be understood to include both quantifiable measures ... and qualitative measures
of costs and benefits that are difficult to quantify, but nevertheless essential to consid-
er."), with EPA, 1983 Guidelines at M5 (cited in note 150) ("[T]he analysis of benefits
should cover the entire spectrum of benefits, from those that can be assigned a dollar
value to those that can only be described qualitatively."). EPA had established an inter-
est in distributional effects and was funding studies on the subject as early as 1974. One
study compared command-and-control regulation with market-based alternatives, find-
ing that the market mechanisms were less costly but resulted in undesirable distribu-
tional effects. See generally Tayler H. Bingham and Allen K. Miedema, Allocative and
Distributive Effects of Alternative Air Quality Attainment Policies (Research Triangle In-
stitute 1974). A second study, funded in the same year, examined how government assis-
tance could be used to help ease local employment shocks associated with environmental
regulation. See generally A. Myrick Freeman III, Evaluation of Adjustment Assistance
Programs with Application for Pollution Control (EPA 1974).
176 EPA, 2000 Guidelines (cited in note 7).
177 Id at i.
178 Id.
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guidance in the A-4 Circular, this document provided an im-
portant backdrop and was cited in public comments during the
development of the OIRA document.179
The most recent EPA Guidelines, issued in 2010, again
demonstrate the agency's substantial expertise on environmen-
tal cost-benefit-analysis questions. The document includes a new
section on calculating baselines; an updated discussion on dis-
counting, with a special emphasis on intergenerational equity;
and a substantially expanded examination of best practices for
estimating distributional effects and how regulations will affect
specific industrial sectors. 180
The release of these extensive field-wide guidelines repre-
sents only part of a broader agency effort to identify best prac-
tices for economic analyses. More specific guidelines have been
developed on valuation of children's health effects,181 non-cancer
health effects,182 and drinking water regulations,183 for example.
The policy offices have developed their own guidelines on eco-
nomic analyses that provide more in-depth discussion of issues
of particular relevance to their area. 8 4 And research funded by
EPA has been directed at literature reviews and surveys de-
signed to identify and justify best practices for analysis.185
Overall, the general impression is clear: it is the agencies'
job to develop the guidance that defines the state of the field for
cost-benefit analysis. While OIRA evaluates and validates the
choices made by agencies, there is an important authorial role in
developing best-practice guidelines that provides agencies with
substantial power to shape how cost-benefit analysis is conduct-
ed.
179 See, for example, Letter from Wesley P. Warren, Senior Fellow for Environmen-
tal Economics, Natural Resources Defense Council, to Lorraine Hunt, Office of Infor-
mation and Regulatory Affairs (May 5, 2003) (on file with author).
180 See generally EPA, 2010 Guidelines (cited in note 4).
181 See generally Environmental Protection Agency, Children's Health Valuation
Handbook (2003).
182 See generally Environmental Protection Agency, Handbook for Non-cancer
Health Effects Valuation (Dec 2000).
183 See generally Environmental Protection Agency, Assessing the Benefits of Drink-
ing Water Regulations: A Primer for Stakeholders (2002).
184 See, for example, Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Air Quality Plan-
ning and Standards, OAQPS Economic Analysis Resource Document 1-1 to -2 (1999).
185 See generally, for example, ICF Incorporated, Baseline Concepts for Regulatory
Impact Analysis (1982).
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B. Value of Statistical Life
The largest benefit from many regulations, at least in mone-
tary terms, is from reductions in mortality risk.186 Estimating
the value of mortality-risk reductions is therefore foundational
to the enterprise of cost-benefit analysis.
The obvious difficulties of assigning a value to mortality risk
were apparent before President Reagan established the cost-
benefit-analysis requirement, and methodologies to do so had ex-
isted for a number of years. The most common methodology
around the time of EPA's founding in 1970 was the human-
capital approach, which calculated the value of a reduction in
mortality risk with reference to the earning potential of the pop-
ulation exposed to that risk.187 An even more "cold-blooded" ap-
proach subtracted consumption, so that only net productivity
served as the basis for calculating the value of risk reduction.188
EPA's 1983 Guidelines ignored the human-capital approach
in favor of a willingness-to-pay approach, which seeks to under-
stand how much consumption an individual would forgo in order
to avoid a mortality risk. From an economic standpoint, this
model has much more to recommend it.189 Rather than examin-
ing the value of risk reduction from the perspective of others-as
in the net human-capital approach-the willingness-to-pay
methodology examines the ex ante value that the risk bearer as-
signs to it. This approach is consistent with the underlying eco-
nomic principles of cost-benefit analysis, which are based on
whether a policy generates sufficient benefits (as measured by
the beneficiaries) to compensate for the costs (as measured by
the burdened parties).
Use of the willingness-to-pay methodology is widely accept-
ed today, both within administrative agencies and in the broad-
er community of economists, but at the time the basic structure
of cost-benefit analysis at EPA was being put in place, this out-
186 See note 5 and accompanying text.
187 E.J. Mishan, Evaluation of Life and Limb: A Theoretical Approach, 79 J Polit
Econ 687, 687-88 (1971) (noting "repeated expressions of dissatisfaction with the [hu-
man-capital] method").
188 Id at 688-89, 690.
189 See id at 691 (stating alternatives to willingness-to-pay methodology are not
"consistent with the basic rationale of the economic calculus used in cost-benefit analy-
sis").
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come was far from obvious. 190 Professors W. Kip Viscusi and Jo-
seph E. Aldy recount an incident in the early 1980s when OSHA
utilized the human-capital approach in a hazard communication
rule because "in its view life was too sacred to value."'191 OIRA re-
jected the rule as too costly and OSHA appealed to then-Vice
President George H.W. Bush; Viscusi was called in to settle the
economic dispute, finding that the rule was cost-benefit justified
when the value-of-statistical-life methodology was used.1s2 The
rule was ultimately adopted.
Although EPA's 1983 Guidelines had passed over the hu-
man-capital approach altogether, by the time of the drafting of
the agency's 1988 Appendix on benefits valuation, the approach
had made something of a comeback. It was apparently consid-
ered sufficiently prominent that the drafters determined it
needed to be addressed. In that document, EPA states that
"[t]here is no general agreement about the appropriate monetary
value for the benefits of mortality reduction."'193 The Appendix
then goes on to point to the human-capital method as "[o]ne ap-
proach to determin[ing] the benefit of a statistical life saved"194
and cites research using the methodology. But the 1988 Appen-
dix emphasizes the criticism that the human-capital method
"fails to reflect the correct measure of benefits: individuals' total
willingness to pay to reduce health risks."19r
EPA's 1988 Benefits Appendix was developed at roughly the
same time that OIRA issued its 1987 Guidance. The OIRA guid-
ance also states that, when goods are not directly traded on
markets, "the willingness-to-pay valuation methodology is con-
ceptually superior" to alternatives.196 By the time of the 2010
guidelines, EPA could reject the human-capital approach in a
cursory fashion, stating that it "has largely been rejected as an
inappropriate measure of the value of reducing mortality
risks."'197 This is one area in which EPA's preferences for how
risks should be valued were very clearly respected.
190 See T.C. Schelling, The Life You Save May Be Your Own, in Samuel B. Chase, ed,
Problems in Public Expenditure Analysis 127, 148-58 (Brookings 1968) (discussing al-
ternative valuation methods).
191 Viscusi and Aldy, 27 J Risk & Uncertainty at 54 (cited in note 6).
192 Id.
193 EPA, 1983 Guidelines at A15 (cited in note 150).
194 Id at A16.
195 Id.
196 OMB, 1987 Guidance at 569 (cited in note 147).
197 EPA, 2010 Guidelines at 7-10 (cited in note 4).
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Arriving at the theoretical basis for mortality-risk reduction
as willingness to pay hardly settles the matter, however. In its
1983 Guidelines, EPA discusses indirect and direct measures for
actually estimating willingness to pay. The indirect method es-
timates an "implicit cost per statistical life saved" based on the
cost of the rule and its expected effects.198 The direct method that
is discussed is based on the increased wages that employees de-
mand to face higher workplace risks.199 The 1983 Guidelines
state that existing research on workplace risks points to "a value
for a statistical life of roughly $400,000 to $7,000,000 (in 1982
dollars)."200 Translated to 2011 dollars, the figures in the 1983
Guidelines are roughly $1 million as a lower estimate and $16
million as an upper estimate.2° 1 Determining where the estimate
falls within this order of magnitude range would remain of par-
amount importance for determining the results of cost-benefit
analysis of agency policy over the next several decades.
There are several important questions in the value-of-
statistical life methodology that are deeply contested. The first,
and most basic, is the unit of analysis-whether total lives or
some other measure. One prominent alternative is the "life-
years" approach. The human condition implies that regulatory
interventions that save lives are, ultimately, able only to delay
death. Some commentators have argued that a methodology that
takes into account the additional life expectancy associated with
a regulation would better reflect its social value.202 Thus, a rule
that avoided the preventable death of a twenty-year-old person
who would otherwise have a life expectancy of fifty more years
would be valued more highly than a rule that would avoid the
death of a seventy-year-old person with a much shorter life ex-
pectancy. 203 One method that has been proposed to do this is the
life-years measure, which values each year of additional life ex-
pectancy equally.24 Others would take age or health status into
account and adjust monetary benefits in some other way. 205 The
198 EPA, 1983 Guidelines at M9 (cited in note 150).
199 See id.
200 Id.
201 BLS Inflation Calculator (cited in note 108).
202 See Viscusi and Aldy, 27 J Risk & Uncertainty at 50-53 (cited in note 6).
203 See Cass R. Sunstein, Lives, Life-Years, and Willingness to Pay, 104 Colum L
Rev 205, 206 (2004).
204 See Michael J. Moore and W. Kip Viscusi, The Quantity-Adjusted Value of Life,
26 Econ Inquiry 369, 373 (1988).
205 See id at 383-85.
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use of life-years falls into a more general category of questions
concerning whether characteristics of the risk-bearer, such as
age, wealth, health status, race, or gender, should be taken into
consideration when setting monetary values for mortality-risk
reduction. These questions remain an area of intense interest in
the methodology of cost-benefit analysis.206
EPA has played an important role in evaluating the life-
years approach and ultimately rejecting it, at least for the time
being. As early as 1984, EPA had commissioned and received a
report reviewing different models on "[t]he valuation of the life
shortening aspects of risk."207 That report found a number of
formal difficulties with taking age into account when valuing
mortality risk, and its results were not consistent with a life-
years model.208 Over twenty years later, evaluating variations on
the life-years model remained a priority for EPA economics re-
search, and an internal white paper produced by an economist
at the Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards examined
practical difficulties of implementing the methodology.209
There were two important moments in particular that
helped place life-years on the methodological back burner: EPA's
2000 Guidelines and the "senior death discount" debate during
the George W. Bush administration. The 2000 Guidelines in-
cluded a lengthy discussion of the life-years approach and some
of the formal and empirical difficulties of putting it into prac-
tice.210 Based on a review of the relevant literature, the Guide-
lines determined that the value of statistical life approach is "an
appropriate default approach for valuing' mortality-risk reduc-
tion, with life years relegated to a secondary role.211 The follow-
ing year, EPA's Science Advisory Board, reviewing the agency's
206 See, for example, EPA, 2010 Guidelines at B-4 to -6 (cited in note 4).
207 Leigh Harrington, The Valuation of the Life Shortening Aspects of Risk I (Sept
17, 1984), online at http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eerm.nsf/vwAN/EE-0297.pdf/$file/EE
-0297.pdf (visited May 15, 2014).
208 See id at 5, 22 figure 6.
209 See Hubbell, 34 Envir & Res Econ at 379-81 (cited in note 85) (discussing Quali-
ty Adjusted Life Years, an extension of the life-years methodology that takes illness and
disability into account).
210 See EPA, 2000 Guidelines at 59-100 (cited in note 7).
211 Id at 93-94. The OMB guidance at the time also provided a substantial discus-
sion of the life-years model, concluding that "there are theoretical advantages to using a
value of statistical life-year-extended approach" but that current research had not devel-
oped a method for valuation without "drawbacks." OMB, 1996 Guidance at Part III.B.5.c
(cited in note 148). Those guidelines largely left the choice of value of statistical life or
value of statistical life-years to the agencies. Id at Part III.B.5.b.
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retrospective analysis of costs and benefits of the Clean Air Act,
went even further, stating: "[Value of statistical life] is the con-
ceptually appropriate method for assessing the benefits of avoid-
ed premature mortality. Alternative measures, such as the value
of a statistical life-year ... are not consistent with the standard
theory of individual willingness-to-pay for mortality risk reduc-
tion.212 OIRA revisited the issue of life-years in its 2003 A-4 Cir-
cular. In that document, OIRA presents life-years as an alterna-
tive methodology, while recognizing its limitations and noting
that EPA's Science Advisory Board found that, more generally,
"available literature does not support adjustments" to the value
of statistical life based on rule-specific risk characteristics.213
The senior-discount debate was one of the few cases in
which conflict over methodological questions in cost-benefit
analysis genuinely spilled over into the public arena. During the
George W. Bush administration, EPA included life-years in an
analysis of the Clear Skies Act, a major environmental legisla-
tive initiative of the administration, as well as in an analysis of
an air-quality rule concerning off-road vehicles.214 Because the
life-years method has the effect of reducing the value attributed
to mortality-risk reductions of older people, it was dubbed the
"senior death discount" and opposed by environmental organiza-
tions as well as representatives for senior citizens.215 The story
was covered in major newspapers, and eventually the admin-
istration was forced to abandon the approach.216 It is unclear
what role, if any, personnel at EPA played in this drama, but it
is certainty conceivable that environmentalists received at least
212 Environmental Protection Agency, Science Advisory Board, Advisory Council for
Clean Air Compliance Analysis, Review of the Draft Analytical Plan for EPA's Second
Prospective Analysis - Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air Act, 1990-2020 26 (September
2001). OIRA revisited the issue of life-years in its 2003 A-4 Circular.
213 See OMB, Circular A-4 at 30 (Sept 17, 2003) (cited in note 149).
214 See Environmental Protection Agency, Technical Addendum: Methodologies for
the Benefit Analysis of the Clear Skies Act of 2003 38-39 (Sept 2003); Environmental
Protection Agency, Control of Emissions from Nonroad Large Spark-Ignition Engines,
and Recreational Engines (Marine and Land-Based), 67 Fed Reg 68242 (Nov 8, 2002).
Senior administration officials, notably then OIRA Administrator John Graham, had
been proponents of the life-years approach. See generally John D. Graham and Jianhui
Hu, Using Quality Adjusted Life Years in Regulatory Analysis: Definitions, Methods, Ap-
plications and Limitations (Canada 2008).
215 See Revesz and Livermore, Retaking Rationality at 79 (cited in note 51); Letter
from David Certner, Director of Federal Affairs, AARP, to Lorraine Hunt, Office of In-
formation and Regulatory Affairs (May 5, 2003), online at http://www.whitehouse.gov
/sites/defaultlfiles/omb/inforeg/2003report346.pdf (visited May 15, 2014).
216 Revesz and Livermore, Retaking Rationality at 79 (cited in note 51).
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unofficial encouragement in their public fight against a method-
ology that the agency had attempted to abandon years before.
Other methodological questions are somewhat more esoter-
ic, but nonetheless extremely important for arriving at a valua-
tion. The two basic methodologies for determining willingness to
pay for mortality risk-wage-differential studies and stated
preferences-were discussed in EPA's 1988 Appendix. The first
is based on wage rates for jobs presenting different mortality
risks, described in a landmark 1976 paper by Professors Richard
Thaler and Sherwin Rosen. 217 This paper was cited favorably in
the 1988 Appendix, as were studies by Olson and Viscusi apply-
ing the methodology.218 The 1988 Appendix also discusses "con-
tingent valuation" techniques that "directly elicit individual
preferences" through questionnaires, favorably citing EPA-
funded reports on the topic by Daniel M. Violette and Lauraine
G. Chestnut.219 The decision as to whether both represent legit-
imate tools or whether one should be preferred can have very
important consequences.
The 2000 Guidelines were again influential. After examin-
ing the advantages and disadvantages of different techniques,
EPA selected twenty-six studies of value of statistical life,220 of
which twenty-one relied on the wage-premium technique. The
wage studies generated an average value of $6.3 million (in 1997
dollars), while the survey method generated an average value of
$3.5 million. The central estimate that EPA settled on was the
mean of the results, $5.8 million221-much closer to the labor
market study estimate. Of course, this represented a discretion-
ary decision; other paths were available. EPA could have aver-
aged the results from the two techniques or used only the con-
tingent-valuation (or labor market) studies. A median value,
217 See generally Richard Thaler and Sherwin Rosen, The Value of Saving a Life:
Evidence from the Labor Market, in Nestor E. Terleckyj, ed, Household Production and
Consumption 265 (Columbia 1976).
218 EPA, 1983 Guidelines at A16 (cited in note 150).
219 Id at A16 (cited in note 150). See generally Daniel M. Violette and Lauraine G.
Chestnut, Valuing Risks: New Information on the Willingness to Pay for Changes in Fa-
tal Risks (Feb 1986) (updating a 1983 study); Daniel M. Violette and Lauraine C. Chest-
nut, Valuing Reductions in Risks: A Review of the Empirical Estimates (June 1983).
220 This list had been used previously by EPA. See Environmental Protection Agen-
cy, The Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air Act, 1970 to 1990 45 (1997). For both anal-
yses, EPA drew the list of studies from W. Kip Viscusi's work. See W. Kip Viscusi, Fatal
Tradeoffs: Public and Private Responsibilities for Risk 52-54 (Oxford 1992).
221 EPA used a Weibull distribution, which had little effect compared to a simple
average. EPA, 2000 Guidelines at 90 (cited in note 7).
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which was lower, could have been chosen. Ultimately, it fell to
EPA to make a final decision.
The value chosen in the 2000 Guidelines remains EPA's de-
fault, updated for inflation.2 But the agency continues to move
forward in developing mortality-risk-valuation methodologies: in
2011, NCEE released a substantial white paper discussing the
use of a "cancer premium" to increase the monetary value of
mortality-risk reduction in cases in which cancer risks are re-
duced, to reflect the dread and morbidity that is associated with
that particular class of harms.23 In addition, the Science Adviso-
ry Board Environmental Economics Committee continues to re-
view potential mechanisms to include population characteris-
tics-and especially age-in valuation techniques.224
Beyond affecting the value that the agency itself uses to
value mortality-risk reduction, EPA's efforts to develop the val-
ue of statistical life have influenced OIRA as well. In 2002,
shortly after EPA released its updated guidance, OIRA began
using a default value of $5 million when agencies did not supply
their own measures. This was substantially higher than the $1
million value promoted by OIRA career personnel during delib-
erations over EPA's 2000 Guidelines. The 2003 Circular A-4
guidance a year later endorsed values between $1 million and
$10 million, a range drawn from the studies used by EPA for its
guidelines.
When the Department of Transportation updated its default
value in 2008, it was advised by OIRA that "the practices of oth-
er Federal agencies are consistent with higher values," and
OIRA noted in particular other agencies that "follow[] the lead
of EPA," which at the time was using a value of up to $7 mil-
lion.225 Ultimately, the Department of Transportation (DOT)
raised its default value from $3 million to $5.8 million, a sub-
stantial increase for an agency that has tended to lag in its mor-
tality risk valuations.26 The role of OIRA in spurring that agen-
222 EPA, 2010 Guidelines at B-1 to -2 (cited in note 4).
223 NCEE, Valuing Mortality Risk Reductions for Environmental Policy: A White
Paper *4 (SAB Review Draft, Dec 2010), online at http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee
/epaleerm.nsf/vwAN/EE-0563-1.pdfl$file/EE-0563-1.pdf (visited May 14, 2014).
224 See, for example, EPA, 2010 Guidelines at B-2 n 4 (cited in note 4).
225 Department of Transportation, Revised Departmental Guidance: Treatment of the
Value of Preventing Fatalities and Injuries in Preparing Economic Analyses *2 (Feb
2008), online at http://www.faa.gov/regulations-policies/policy-guidancebenefitcost
/media/Revised%20Value%20Of%2OLife%2OGuidance%2oFeburary%202008.pdf (visited
May 15, 2014).
226 Id at *3.
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cy toward higher values, and promoting the studies and esti-
mates used by EPA, shows the long-term persuasive power of
EPA's economic research. A recent review by OIRA of the mor-
tality-risk values used by several agencies, including OSHA, the
FDA, and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), found
that "in recent years, actual agency practice has [generally]
avoided significant inconsistencies" in mortality-risk valuation,
noting the influence of EPA in the area and highlighting several
areas in which the agency planned to continue elaborating the
methodology.227
Perhaps most notable, agencies are given a wide berth on
the issue by OIRA, providing a substantial degree of discretion
that has been reflected at various times in differences in valua-
tions.228 Given the substantial effort that EPA has expended de-
veloping its own values and the impressive case supporting its
choices-largely relying on peer reviewed literature-it would be
extremely difficult for OIRA to impose a different value on the
agency. Though efforts to harmonize mortality values across
agencies may be useful,229 OIRA would have difficulty directing
such a process, for practical and political reasons. It is likely
therefore that agencies will continue to have the most influence
on the value that is chosen and that any harmonization that
does occur will be through agencies' own efforts.
C. Nonmortality Benefits and Stated-Preference Studies
Mortality-risk reduction is a major benefit for many regula-
tions, but there are a number of other important regulatory ben-
efits. There are nonmortality health-related risks, such as asth-
ma or waterborne illness. Further, in the environmental context,
there are many nonhealth benefits that are both tangible (such
as visibility, recreational opportunities, and habitat for pollina-
tors) and intangible, including many of the benefits associated
with wilderness area preservation in remote areas.
227 Office of Management and Budget, 2012 Report to Congress on the Costs and
Benefits of Federal Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal En-
tities 18 n 20 (2012).
228 Viscusi and Aldy, 27 J Risk & Uncertainty at 54 (cited in note 6).
229 See Letter from Michael A. Livermore and Jason A. Schwartz, Institute for Poli-
cy Integrity, New York University School of Law, to Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs Administrator Cass Sunstein 7-9 (June 11, 2012), online at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/0mb/ inforeg/2012-cb/comments/ipi-20 12-draft
-report-to-congress-comments.pdf (visited May 15, 2014).
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Though the theoretical willingness-to-pay standard still ap-
plies, many of these nonmortality benefits pose particularly vex-
ing measurement problems. The labor market analysis dis-
cussed in Part III.B has become the primary methodology for
estimating mortality-risk-reduction value, but for the most part,
revealed-preference methods are not as effective for nonmortali-
ty benefits. Even nonmortality health-risk preferences are diffi-
cult to measure through behavior in labor markets.230 The clos-
est candidate is the travel-cost methodology, which estimates
the value of recreational opportunities.231 Under this approach,
the value of. recreation can be estimated by examining the
amount of time and resources that individuals are willing to
spend to take advantage of it.232 Travel time has been used in
cost-benefit analyses of some rule makings, but its applicability
is relatively limited.233
An attribute that cannot be even theoretically observed in
markets of at least some environmental goods is so-called exist-
ence value. Though some portion of the value of environmental
goods derives from their use-timber or recreation for forests,
drinking or swimming for freshwater bodies, commercial and
recreational fishing for oceans-there is a well-documented phe-
nomenon that many people express a positive willingness to pay
to protect resources that they will never use.234 This nonuse val-
ue is associated with a preference for a resource to continue to
exist, regardless of whether it provides any consumption oppor-
tunity. This existence value can be quite large: for example, ex-
istence-value surveys done at the time of the Exxon Valdez oil
spill showed a national willingness to pay to protect the Prince
William Sound in the billions of dollars.235
230 See Charles Brown, Equalizing Differences in the Labor Market, 94 Q J Econ
113, 131-33 (1980).
231 See, for example, V. Kerry Smith, William H. Desvousges, and Matthew P.
McGivney, The Opportunity Cost of Travel Time in Recreation Demand Models, 59 Land
Econ 259, 260-62 (1983).
232 See, for example, John Loomis, Shizuka Yorizane, and Douglas Larson, Testing
Significance of Multi-destination and Multi-purpose Trip Effects in a Travel Cost Method
Demand Model for Whale Watching Trips, 29 Ag & Res Econ Rev 183, 183-85 (2000).
233 See, for example, William H. Desvouges and V. Kerry Smith, The Travel Cost
Approach for Valuing Improved Water Quality: Additional Considerations 1-4 to -5
(1984).
234 See Tom Crowards, Nonuse Values and the Environment: Economic and Ethical
Motivations, 6 Envir Values 143, 143-45 (1997).
235 See Richard T. Carson, et al, Contingent Valuation and Lost Passive Use: Dam-
ages from the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 25 Envir & Res Econ 257, 278 (2003).
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Given that observation of market behavior cannot serve as
the basis for many nonmortality benefits, stated-preference
studies (in other words, contingent valuation) are the only alter-
native. Because of the prevalence of difficult-to-measure goods in
the environmental field, "[iut is hard to overestimate the central
importance of contingent valuation to modern environmental
economics.236 A recent bibliography of contingent valuation
found over 7,500 papers, almost all of which are in the environ-
mental field. 237 Environmental-economics conferences and jour-
nals typically have major portions devoted to new contingent-
valuation studies.238
In a major review of the history of contingent valuation con-
ducted by Professors Richard Carson and W. Michael Hanemann
in 2005, the authors find that "[flunding from the U.S. Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency has played a particularly im-
portant role in contingent valuation's development."239 Relatively
early on in the agency's history, it "began to fund a program of
research with the avowed methodological purpose of determin-
ing the promise and problems of the [contingent valuation]
method."240 Initially, funding was meant to undertake basic test-
ing of the method and "establish its theoretical underpin-
nings.241 After the Reagan order gave "sharper focus" to EPA's
cost-benefit-analysis efforts, the agency's interest "shifted to as-
certaining just how effectively contingent valuation could be
used for policy purposes."242
Professor Clifford S. Russell argues that the "most dramatic
sea change of the past 30 years" in environmental economics
was a shift in attitude from a situation in which contingent val-
uation "was not taken at all seriously by the profession" to one
in which "journal editors complain of being flooded by papers
about [the technique]."243 Russell "would give a large share of the
credit (or blame if you happen to think badly of the approach) to
236 Richard T. Carson and W. Michael Hanemann, Contingent Valuation, in Karl-
Gbran Miler and Jeffrey R. Vincent, eds, 2 Handbook of Environmental Economics 821,
826 (Elsevier 2005). This piece provides a very useful overview and introduction to con-
tingent valuation, its history, and current issues.
237 Carson, Contingent Valuation at vi (cited in note 144).
238 See Carson and Hanemann, Contingent Valuation at 826 (cited in note 236).
239 Id at 838.
240 Id.
241 Id.
242 Carson and Hanemann, Contingent Valuation at 838 (cited in note 236).
243 Clifford S. Russell, Thirty Years of Water and Environmental Economics, 116 J
Contemp Water Rsrch & Educ 67, 69 (2000).
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Alan Carlin at EPA" for "find[ing] and protect[ing] the money
that supported most of the early efforts.244 These early efforts
produced the basic outline of the methodology and validated that
it could be used without "pervasive strategizing in the respons-
es."245 Even the name "contingent valuation" was "devised to
avoid the word 'survey' which was a red flag to OMB review-
ers."246
The Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989 brought contingent valu-
ation out into the spotlight, as the technique was used to provide
a monetary estimate of the natural resource damages caused by
the spill. Faced with substantial liability, a reputational disas-
ter, and the threat of ongoing litigation and future regulation,
the oil industry "mounted an aggressive public relations cam-
paign intended to convince policy makers that contingent valua-
tion in any form was too unreliable to be used for any pur-
pose."247
Two EPA-supported projects helped the technique weather
the storm. First was an assessment of the methodology commis-
sioned in 1983, which included a review panel with figures such
as Nobel Prize-winning economists Kenneth Arrow and Daniel
Kahneman.248 The final assessment, released in 1986, found that
although there were a number of important challenges, the
methodology held promise as a way to examine values that
would otherwise be very difficult to measure.249 The second was
an EPA cooperative agreement 250 involving Robert Mitchell, then
at Resources for the Future, and Professor Richard Carson,
which resulted in the 1989 book coauthored by Mitchell and
Carson, Using Surveys to Value Public Goods: The Contingent
Valuation Method.251 That book, considered the "bible" of the




247 Carson and Hanemann, Contingent Valuation at 840 (cited in note 236).
248 Id at 838.
249 Ronald G. Cummings, David C. Brookshire, and William D. Schulze, I.B Valuing
Environmental Goods: A State of the Arts Assessment of the Contingent Valuation Method
2 (Institute for Policy Research 1986).
250 See generally Robert Cameron Mitchell and Richard T. Carson, The Use of Con-
tingent Valuation Data for Benefit/Cost Analysis in Water Pollution Control (1986).
251 See generally Robert Cameron Mitchell and Richard T. Carson, Using Surveys to
Value Public Goods: The Contingent Valuation Method (Resources for the Future 1989).
252 Russell, 116 J Contemp Water Rsrch & Educ at 69 (cited in note 243).
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methodology and "played a central role in defining the practice
of contingent valuation. 253
The EPA-commissioned assessment, publication of the
Mitchell and Carson book, and industry pressure and criticism
ultimately culminated in the most important defining moment
for contingent valuation when a different agency-the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)-convened a
blue-ribbon panel in 1992, chaired by Kenneth Arrow and Rob-
ert Solow (also a Nobel Prize-winning economist), to review the
economics literature, hear expert testimony, and determine
whether the methodology was sufficiently advanced to be used
for public policy. The NOAA panel was concerned with elements
of the contingent-valuation technique and discussed certain
problems, such as responses that were not consistent with ra-
tional-choice theory, the fact that participants acted without a
meaningful budget constraint, and information problems.254 But
the NOAA panel did not reject the methodology, finding instead
that it could "convey useful information" and "produce estimates
reliable enough to be [used]" in government processes. 255 The
work that had been done by EPA and a broad group of econo-
mists outside the agency had been vindicated.
After the NOAA report, EPA continued to fund a significant
number of studies using the contingent-valuation technique both
to develop specific valuations for certain types of goods and to
respond to the concerns about the methodology raised in the re-
port. An analysis by Cummings and Osborn in 1996 attempted
to identify survey and interview strategies to address the prob-
lem that participants in contingent-valuation studies respond to
hypothetical situations rather than genuine market choices.256 A
multiuniversity team was funded to examine how different con-
tingent-valuation techniques compared to market data concern-
ing a green-pricing program offered by Niagara Mohawk Power
253 Carson and Hanemann, Contingent Valuation at 839 (cited in note 236).
254 See National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Natural Resource Dam-
age Assessments under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 58 Fed Reg 4601, 4604-05 (1993).
255 Id at 4610. The NOAA panel was concerned with litigation and the use of contin-
gent value to set damages, but its methodological findings were not limited to those cir-
cumstances, and it has been understood to be a broader vindication of the methodology.
256 Ronald G. Cummings and Laura L. Osborne, Valuing Environmental Damages
with Stated Preference Methods: New Approaches that Yield Demonstrably Valid Values
for Non-priced, Environmental Goods (1996), online at http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee
/epa/eed.nsf/025a7218b79687da852575a6006ab361/6491a74cfb755fee852575a7005e9315!
OpenDocument (visited May 15, 2014).
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Corporation.257 Morbidity risks were also an important portion of
the research agenda, which included a study on infertility risk
associated with exposure to endocrine-disrupting chemicals.258
The work that EPA has done to bolster contingent valuation
has been used not only in the agency's own cost-benefit analysis;
it has been influential at OIRA as well. The 1996 OIRA Guid-
ance cited the Mitchell and Carson "bible"259 of contingent valua-
tion, describing it as "a valuable discussion on the potential
strengths and pitfalls associated with the use of contingent-
valuation methods."260 The 1996 Guidance also noted that con-
tingent valuation was "increasingly common" and that "the
practice of contingent valuation is rapidly evolving," while also
discussing reasons why "analytical care" must be exercised.261
An even more extensive discussion of the contingent-
valuation methodology was included in OIRA's 2003 A-4 Circu-
lar. OIRA recognized that these studies "have also been widely
used in regulatory analyses by Federal agencies" and included a
list of nine best practices (governing topics such as sampling
methods and the need for "the survey instrument [to] be de-
signed to probe beyond general attitudes") that should be fol-
lowed by agencies.262 The A-4 Circular includes a number of ca-
veats about the use of contingent valuation, including a concern
that "[t]he challenge in designing quality stated-preference stud-
ies is arguably greater for non-use values" and the warning that
"a number based on a poor quality study is not necessarily supe-
rior to no number at all."263 The guidance also states that
"[o]ther things equal, you should prefer revealed preference data
over stated preference data because [the former] are based on
actual decisions."264 EPA, in a subsequent regulatory-impact
analysis of a water-quality rule in 2004, characterized OIRA's
position as "guarded acceptance of stated preference methods."265
257 William Schulze, et al, Can Contingent Valuation Measure Passive-Use Values?
28-62 (1999).
258 See generally George Van Houtven and V. Kerry Smith, Valuing Reductions in
Environmental Sources of Infertility Risk Using the Efficient Household Framework
(1997).
259 Russell, 116 J Contemp Water Rsrch & Educ at 69 (cited in note 243).
260 OMB, 1996 Guidance at Selected Further Readings (cited in note 148).
261 Id at Part III.B.3.
262 OMB, Circular A-4 at 22-23 (Sept 17, 2003) (cited in note 149).
263 Id at 24.
264 Id.
265 Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Water, Economic and Environmental
Benefits Analysis of the Final Effluent Limitations Guidelines and New Source Perfor-
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Contingent valuation of environmental harms remains an
important component of cost-benefit analysis and therefore
EPA's research agenda.266 In a recent controversial rule making,
EPA proposed standards governing the cooling-water-intake
systems at power plants to avoid unnecessary fish mortality that
occurs when fish are inadvertently sucked into water-cooled fa-
cilities.267 The regulatory-impact analysis in support of the rule
indicated that the quantified and monetized benefits associated
with all regulatory options were lower than the estimated
costs. 268 Subsequent to the rule making, EPA conducted a con-
tingent-valuation study to determine "willingness to pay [] for
improvements to fishery resources" affected by the rule.269 In its
notice of data availability making the results of the survey pub-
lic, EPA argues that "[s]tated preference methods have ... been
tested and validated through years of research and are widely
accepted by... government agencies and the U.S. courts as reli-
able techniques for estimating non-market values."270 Initial re-
sults that EPA has gathered show an implicit valuation of a one-
percentage-point improvement in different measures of fish mor-
tality between $1.40 and $9.34 per household per year; multi-
plied by the total number of relevant households, some of the
more stringent regulatory options (which nearly eliminate fish
mortality) could result in monetized benefits of tens of billions of
dollars.271
mance Standards for the Concentrated Aquatic Animal Production Industry Point Source
Category 8-18 n 23 (2004).
266 One recent agency-funded project includes a willingness-to-pay survey in the Ad-
irondack Mountains and the Southern Appalachian Mountain region to estimate values
for reductions in ecological harms associated with acid rain. See Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, 2008 Progress Report: Valuation of Regional Ecological Response to Acidifi-
cation and Techniques for Transferring Estimates, online at http://cfpub.epa.gov
/ncer-abstracts/index.cfmfuseactiondisplay.abstractDetailabstract7726report/2008
(visited May 15, 2014).
267 See generally Environmental Protection Agency, National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System-Cooling Water Intake Structures at Existing Facilities and Phase I
Facilities, 76 Fed Reg 22174 (2011).
268 Id at 22268.
269 Environmental Protection Agency, National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System-Proposed Regulations to Establish Requirements for Cooling Water Intake
Structures at Existing Facilities; Notice of Data Availability Related to EPA's Stated
Preference Survey, 77 Fed Reg 34927, 34929 (2012).
270 Id at 34930 (quotation marks omitted), quoting John C. Bergstom and Richard C.
Ready, What Have We Learned From over 20 Years of Farmland Amenity Valuation Re-
search in North America?, 31 Rev Ag Econ 21, 26 (2009).
271 See Memorandum from Erik Helm, Environmental Protection Agency, to the
Section 316(b) Existing Facilities Rule Record (June 5, 2012) (discussing methodology for
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D. Interagency Influence
The cost-benefit-analysis methodology creates multiple op-
portunities for agencies to interact with each other. Agencies can
explicitly seek guidance from one another and borrow or rely on
each other's work. Agencies can coordinate to attempt to influ-
ence OIRA or, alternatively, they can take opposing viewpoints
and attempt to convince each other, potentially with OIRA per-
forming a mediating role. In each of these cases, the methodolog-
ical advances or preferences of one agency can diffuse through-
out the administrative system.
EPA's work on the value of statistical life, for instance, has
been widely influential. One example is the case of the DOT,
which had used a relatively low value ($2.5 million in 1993)
based on a smaller sample of studies than EPA, but which, over
time, gradually began to include higher estimates, bringing the
agency more in line with EPA.272 In 2008, the DOT released new
guidance that required a Value of a Statistical Life estimate of
$5.8 million, substantially higher than the previous figure and
closer to the figure used by EPA at that time.273 When the newly
created DHS commissioned a report on the value of mortality-
risk reduction, the analysis relied heavily on EPA's 2000 Guide-
lines directly and used the basic framework and much of the
same research, in addition to relying on more updated work con-
ducted by the same researchers.74 Ultimately, DHS has used the
$6.3 million value-of-statistical-life estimate from that analysis
in several rule makings as part of its effort to improve its cost-
benefit-analysis practice.275 Variation among agencies in their
valuation of statistical life remains significant, but many agen-
cies are moving in the direction of EPA's higher estimates.276
aggregating results in Sections 7 and 8 and providing information in Tables 3, 15, and
22).
272 Memorandum from Tyler D. Duvall, Assistant Secretary for Transportation Poli-




274 See Lisa Robinson, Valuing Mortality Risk Reductions in Homeland Security
Regulatory Analyses 12-16 (2008).
275 DHS has used the $6.3 million figure in breakeven analyses. Department of
Homeland Security, Passenger Weight and Inspected Vessel Stability Requirements, 75
Fed Reg 78064, 78079 (2010); Department of Homeland Security, Carbon Dioxide Fire
Suppression Systems on Commercial Vessels, 77 Fed Reg 33860, 33868 (2012).
276 Compare Letter from Michael A. Livermore, et al, Institute for Policy Integrity to
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs Administrator Cass Sunstein 6-7 (May 10,
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A particularly striking recent example in which techniques
and concepts that had been pioneered by EPA were used in an
extremely different context was a rule making by the Depart-
ment of Justice (DOJ) to reduce instances of sexual assault in
correctional facilities.277 This rule was promulgated pursuant to
the Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003278 (PREA) and finalized
in May 2012. The rule establishes requirements for prisons,
jails, juvenile facilities, community corrections facilities, and
temporary-holding facilities in eleven areas, including training
and education, screening for risk of abuse, reporting, medical
and mental healthcare, and audits. According to its text, the
purpose of the rule "is to prevent, detect, and respond to sexual
abuse in confinement facilities.279
The DOJ, while cognizant that "placing a monetary value on
reducing the number of sexual abuse victim[s] presents consid-
erable methodological difficulties," nevertheless moved forward
with a sophisticated regulatory-impact analysis that included
estimates of both costs and benefits.280 In its analysis, the DOJ
adopted the willingness-to-pay standard urged by OIRA in its A-
4 Circular (and earlier promoted by EPA).281 In deriving its es-
timates, the DOJ relied on the concept of existence value, which,
as discussed above, received substantial support by EPA in the
2012) (noting variation among three rules adopted by different agencies in the year 2011:
$6 million for a Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration rule, $7.9 million for an
FDA rule, and $8.7 million for an EPA rule), with Viscusi and Aldy, 27 J Risk & Uncer-
tainty at 55 table 12 (cited in note 6) (highlighting rules adopted by different agencies
during the 1980s and 1990s with value of statistical lives varying between $1 million
and $6.3 million (in 2000 dollars)).
277 See generally Letter from Michael A. Livermore, et al, Institute for Policy Integ-
rity to Robert Hinchman, Office Legal Policy, Department of Justice (Apr 4, 2011), online
at http://policyintegrity.org/documents/Policy-Integrity-PREAComments-4-4_1l.pdf
(visited May 15, 2014) (regarding the proposed rule making).
278 Pub L No 108-79, 117 Stat 972, codified at 42 USC §§ 15601-09.
279 Department of Justice, National Standards to Prevent, Detect, and Respond to
Prison Rape, 77 Fed Reg 37106, 37106 (2012) (issuing the rule for final administrative
review).
280 Department of Justice, Prison Rape Elimination Act Regulatory Impact Assess-
ment 39 (2012). DOJ faced criticism for this move. See Lisa Heinzerling, Cost-Benefit
Jumps the Shark: The Department of Justice's Economic Analysis of Prison Rape,
Georgetown Law Faculty Blog (June 13, 2002), online at http://gulcfac.typepad.com
/georgetown.university-law/2012/06/cost-benefit-jumps-the-shark.html (visited May 15,
2014). But see Rick Hills, In Defense of Cost-Benefit Analysis: Lesson from Recent Rules
for Preventing Prison Rape, PrawfsBlawg (June 16, 2012), online at
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2012/06/in-defense-of-cost-benefit-analysis-lessons
-from-recent-rules-for-preventing-prison-rape.html (visited May 15, 2014).
281 DOJ, Prison Rape Elimination Act Regulatory Impact Assessment at 40 (cited in
note 280).
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environmental context. The DOJ defined the existence value rel-
evant for the PREA rule makings as arising because "it is worth
something to people to know that they live in a crime-free (or
crime-reduced) society.282 Rather than attempting to value, ex
post, realized sexual assaults, the willingness-to-pay model
adopted by the DOJ parallels the value-of-statistical-life ap-
proach that EPA has used for many years by taking an ex ante,
risk-based perspective.83
The DOJ settled on a value of $310,000 in 2011 dollars for
each instance of sexual assault that was averted by the rule.284
To arrive at that value, the agency relied on a study by Professor
Mark A. Cohen and coauthors.85 The authors of that analysis
(which was funded by a DOJ grant) utilized the contingent-
valuation methodology that they state was "developed in the en-
vironmental economics literature.286 The authors found the
methodology attractive because it "has been used extensively to
place dollar values on nonmarket goods such as improvements
in air quality, saving endangered species and reducing the risk
of early death-social benefits that do not have direct market
analogs.287 The authors point to "literally hundreds of [contin-
gent valuation] studies, meta-analyses and textbooks" and cite
directly to the Mitchell and Carson book, the EPA-funded project
on stated preference studies discussed above.288
The importance of EPA in making possible the analysis that
was relied on in the PREA rule is easy to see. Without EPA's
support, the pervasiveness of the contingent-valuation method
would have been substantially lower, and there would have been
much less theoretical and empirical work to undergird the Co-
hen, et al, study. Both the research methods-refined over many
years-and the theory behind contingent valuation had been
well established by the time of the Cohen, et al, study, the
methodology had been endorsed by OIRA, and it had weathered
major industry attacks. Though it is possible that Cohen, et al,
282 Id.
283 See EPA, 1983 Guidelines at M8-M9 (cited in note 150).
284 More specifically, the $310,000 figure was applied to the gravest type of sexual
assault in a hierarchy that was developed by the agency. DOJ, Prison Rape Elimination
Act Regulatory Impact Assessment at 42 (cited in note 280).
285 Id at 40, citing Mark A. Cohen, et al, Willingness-to-Pay for Crime Control Pro-
grams, 42 Criminol 89, 98 (2004).
286 Cohen, et al, 42 Criminol at 91 (cited in note 285).
287 Id.
288 Id at 91 & n 3, citing Mitchell and Carson, Using Surveys to Value Public Goods:
The Contingent Valuation Method (cited in note 251).
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could and would have developed the methodology whole cloth, it
was much easier to use the off-the-rack version that was, essen-
tially, provided by EPA.
A final recent example of agencies influencing each other
through cost-benefit-analysis methodology is provided by an in-
teragency process convened to establish a monetary estimate for
the value of greenhouse gas reductions. In 2007, the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that the DOT fuel-efficiency standards for light trucks
in model years 2008-2011 violated the Administrative Proce-
dure Act's "arbitrary and capricious" standard because the agen-
cy failed to adequately account for the social value associated
with greenhouse gas reductions.289 The agency had cited sub-
stantial uncertainty about the correct valuation in justifying its
failure to include an estimate in its cost-benefit analysis, but the
court found this argument unpersuasive, stating that "while the
record shows that there is a range of values, the value of carbon
emissions reduction is certainly not zero.290 The case, along with
the large number of greenhouse gas regulations anticipated in
the wake of the Supreme Court's Massachusetts v Environmen-
tal Protection Agency291 decision, created a need for a consistent
valuation for climate change damages that could be used in cost-
benefit analyses.92
The Obama administration responded to this need by con-
vening an interagency taskforce charged with developing a con-
sistent, government-wide "social cost of carbon" to be used in fu-
ture rule makings.293 This group, which met over the course of
many months,294 ultimately released its findings as an appendix
289 Center for Biological Diversity v National Highway Traffic Safety Administra-
tion, 508 F3d 508, 533 (9th Cir 2007), vacd 538 F3d 1172 (9th Cir 2008).
290 Center for Biological Diversity, 508 F3d at 533.
291 549 US 497 (2006).
292 In addition, many environmental rules that are not directly targeted at green-
house gas emissions have the "ancillary benefit" of reducing emissions, which should also
be accounted for in cost-benefit analyses of those rule makings. See Dallas Burtraw and
Michael A. Toman, Estimating the Ancillary Benefits of Greenhouse Gas Mitigation Poli-
cies in the US, in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Ancillary
Benefits and Costs of Greenhouse Gas Mitigation 481, 482-84 (2000).
293 Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon, United States Govern-
ment, Appendix 15A: Social Cost of Carbon for Regulatory Impact Analysis under Execu-
tive Order 12866 1 (2010) ("SCC Taskforce").
294 The taskforce was first mentioned in a Department of Energy rule making con-
cerning energy-efficiency requirements for vending machines. Letter from Institute for
Policy Integrity and Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) to Environmental Protection
Agency Administrator Lisa Jackson (Nov 27, 2009), online at http://policyintegrity.org
/documents/SCC-Comments-EPAFINAL'pdf (visited May 15, 2014).
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to the regulatory-impact analysis of a joint rule making between
the DOT and EPA establishing fuel-efficiency standards for au-
tomobiles.295 Participants in the interagency group included sev-
eral White House offices-including OIRA, the Council on Envi-
ronmental Quality, and the Council of Economic Advisors-as
well as a large number of agencies, including not only EPA and
DOT, but also the Department of Energy, NOAA, and the De-
partment of the Treasury.296
The social-cost-of-carbon estimate is based on "integrated
assessment models" that attempt to translate the effects pre-
dicted by complex climactic models into economic terms. 297 For
example, if increased temperatures and water scarcity will neg-
atively affect agricultural production, the value of that lost
productivity is used. The harm of sea-level rise can be calculated
by examining the value of the lands that are exposed to inunda-
tion. This approach was pioneered by Professor William D.
Nordhaus, who developed the first large-scale models.298 There
are several particularly important issues that were decided by
the taskforce. These include the choice of models, the type of dis-
counting used, the discount rate, the treatment of catastrophic
effects, and whether nondomestic effects are considered. Each of
these decisions can have very large effects on the ultimate value.
The deliberations over the social cost of carbon were not
open to the public, so it is difficult to know what influence any
particular agency had on that process. But EPA had the greatest
level of expertise on all of the relevant questions: to the extent
that technical arguments were persuasive, EPA was extremely
well positioned to make them. Some of the final decisions also
reflected long-standing EPA positions, such as the use of a risk-
free consumption discount rate. Indeed, the final document in-
cluded consideration of a discount rate of 2.5 percent, 299 which is
lower than current OIRA guidance.300 There is also a mechanism
to account for catastrophic damages through use of a higher val-
ue that represented a ninety-fifth-percentile damage estimate.301
The taskforce also considered a methodology to account for un-
295 See generally SCC Taskforce (cited in note 293).
296 Id.
297 Id at 5.
298 See William D. Nordhaus, Managing the Global Commons: The Economics of
Climate Change 7-21 (MIT 1994).
299 SCC Taskforce at 24 (cited in note 293).
300 OMB, Circular A-4 at 33 (Sept 17, 2003) (cited in note 149).
301 See SCC Taskforce at 32-34 (cited in note 293).
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certainty in the discount rate, which has the effect of according
greater value to the long-range interests.32 While it is extremely
likely that EPA did not prevail on all of the methodological posi-
tions that it forwarded-and the final document probably does
not reflect agency preferences on many questions-it is unlikely
that its presence did not play an important role in shaping the
ultimate outcome.
The influence of EPA's role in these deliberations may also
extend well beyond the face of the taskforce document. There are
many valid criticisms of the methodological choices in the final
taskforce guidance,303 and on its own terms, the document is
meant to be "updated over time to reflect increasing knowledge
of the science and economics of climate impacts."304 There are
several areas in which questions are explicitly left open for fu-
ture inquiry.305 Arguments presented and honed during these
discussions, even if not ultimately reflected in the final docu-
ment, are likely to resurface at a later time.
IV. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS IN THE REGULATORY STATE
Agencies' ability to influence the methodology of cost-benefit
analysis casts into doubt the prevailing view that the technique
is primarily a tool to bring agencies under presidential control
by helping OIRA assert authority over agencies. The real effects
of cost-benefit analysis on agency autonomy and political control
are more complex and will be the focus of this Part.
The main theoretic framework that is used to understand
the place of agencies in the constitutional structure is the prin-
cipal-agent model. In an influential account, Professor Eric Pos-
ner argues that cost-benefit analysis is best understood within
that framework as a means for the president to better control
agencies by reducing information asymmetries.306 Part IV.A will
apply the insights of the prior sections of this Article to the prin-
cipal-agent model, ultimately arriving at a more nuanced ac-
count of the role of cost-benefit analysis.
302 Id at 23-24.
303 See generally Letter from Institute for Policy Integrity and EDF to Jackson (cit-
ed in note 294).
304 SCC Taskforce at 1 (cited in note 293).
305 "The sensitivity of the results to other aspects of the models (e.g., the carbon cy-
cle or damage function) is also important to explore in the context of future revisions to
the SCC but has not been incorporated into these estimates." SCC Taskforce at 6 (cited
in note 293).
306 See Posner, 68 U Chi L Rev at 1142-43 (cited in note 25).
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Part IV.B relaxes the assumption within the standard prin-
cipal-agent model that agencies and political principals have
fixed, nonmalleable preferences and argues that, under this
more realistic model of executive branch relations, cost-benefit
analysis is usefully understood as serving a deliberative func-
tion. The consequences of agency control over methodological
development within this deliberative model are then discussed.
If cost-benefit analysis does not, as argued here, promote
presidential power in a straightforward fashion, the consistency
of presidential support for the practice presents something of a
mystery. Part IV.C provides several potential explanations for
why presidents have continued to support cost-benefit analysis
and have at least accepted that agencies will play the primary
role in developing the methodology.
The final Section focuses on how the more complete picture
of the development of cost-benefit-analysis methodology provid-
ed in this Article should influence normative debates about the
desirability of regulatory review and cost-benefit analysis. It
suggests that the current arrangement, far from being a capitu-
lation in favor of presidentially dominated agencies, is a complex
compromise between conflicting normative conceptions of the
role of agencies and political oversight in a democratic polity.
The middle ground achieved by the current allocation of respon-
sibilities over cost-benefit analysis, while satisfying to strong
partisans of neither political control nor agency independence,
has proven to be a workable and relatively stable solution given
the reality of conflicting tensions in the modern administrative
state.
A. The Principal-Agent Model
The dominant theoretical approach for understanding polit-
ical control of agencies is the principal-agent model. 307 Under the
307 See Charles K. Rowley and Robert Elgin, Government and Its Bureaucracy: A
Bilateral Bargaining versus a Principal-Agent Approach, in Charles K. Rowley, Robert
D. Tollison, and Gordon Tullock, eds, The Political Economy of Rent Seeking 267, 285-88
(Kiuwer 2010); Posner, 68 U Chi L Rev 1137, 1142-43 (cited in note 25); Gary J. Miller,
The Political Evolution of Principal-Agent Models, 8 Ann Rev Polit Sci 203, 207-08
(2005); McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast, 3 J L, Econ & Org at 246-48 (cited in note 35).
But see William A. Niskanen Jr, Bureaucracy and Representative Government 45-77
(Aldine 1971) (offering monopoly supplier model of agencies); Steven P. Croley, Regula-
tion and Public Interests: The Possibility of Good Regulatory Government 81-101 (Prince-
ton 2008) (arguing that the structure of administrative law is designed to balance partic-
ipation and limit the dominating influence of special interests in regulatory proceedings).
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principal-agent model of administrative agencies, the president
and Congress are the political principals, while agencies are
charged with acting on their behalf. Because the political princi-
pals cannot monitor agencies perfectly, there is some residual
discretion, creating space between the desires of the principals
and the ultimate policy outcome. Principals invest in monitoring
until marginal monitoring costs equal the marginal benefits of
control.
There is a relatively simple way to apply the principal-agent
model to regulatory review. The president owns the residual re-
sponsibility for implementing statutes but must delegate sub-
stantial regulatory powers to agencies.308 The inability of the
president to directly monitor agencies creates the need for in-
termediary institutions that occupy the middle rung of a "princi-
pal/supervisor/agent" ladder.39 Under this model, OIRA serves
as an (imperfect) proxy for the president.310 Professor Eric Pos-
ner argues that cost-benefit analysis fits into the principal-agent
framework by reducing information asymmetries between prin-
cipals and agents, thereby facilitating political control.311
The analysis of Parts II and III-showing agency influence
over cost-benefit-analysis methodology-reduces the power of
Posner's analysis. Most obviously, if agents are charged with the
development of cost-benefit-analysis methodology, its informa-
tional value for principals will be reduced. This would have the
consequence of increasing monitoring costs and exacerbating
principal-agent difficulties.
This effect would occur even though the development of cost-
benefit analysis occurs within the shadow of OIRA review. Un-
der the principal-supervisor-agent account, OIRA is the ultimate
customer for agencies' cost-benefit analyses. This position would
give OIRA substantial demand-side power: when it had method-
ological preferences, agencies would have incentives to conform
to those preferences. Conducting cost-benefit analysis that OIRA
rejected as illegitimate would not be in the agency's interest.
308 See Eugene F. Fama and Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Con-
trol, 26 J L & Econ 301, 302-03 (1983) (describing how separation of ownership and
management gives rise to principal-agent problem in business firms).
309 Jean Tirole, Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organi-
zations, 2 J L, Econ & Org 181, 187-205 (1986) (showing that a simple model of princi-
pal-agent-supervisor generates complex potential coalitions).
310 See Bagley and Revesz, 106 Colum L Rev at 1307-10 (cited in note 41) (question-
ing OIRA's ability to proxy presidential preferences).
311 Posner, 68 U Chi L Rev at 1143 (cited in note 25).
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OIRA could leverage its position to, at least partially, overcome
some of the advantages held by agencies discussed in Part II.312
But the same dynamic discussed in Part I.C that accounts
for the safe-harbor effect also limits OIRA's ability to impose its
methodological preferences. OIRA and agencies must jointly re-
solve disputes over cost-benefit-analysis methodology, while
minimizing the need for arbitration from higher-level political
officials. 313 One strategy for reducing conflict over these ques-
tions is to adopt generally applicable norms to be applied in spe-
cific cases. By making reference to a neutral set of norms, OIRA
and agencies can construct themselves as participants in a ra-
tional dialogue over how best to realize those norms, rather than
as combatants in a politically fraught battle of wills that would
require constant intervention.
The economic discipline, as a well-defined epistemic com-
munity, provides an attractive practical solution to this problem.
Although there certainly may have been actors within agencies
who did not accept the legitimacy of economic rationality as an
arbiter of regulatory policy, economics has become the de facto
language of regulatory review.314 The link between cost-benefit
analysis and the economic discipline is now often taken for
granted, but it was not inevitable-there are many areas of gov-
ernment decision making that do not hew nearly as closely to
mainstream economic thought. Instead, this link was the solu-
tion to the very specific dilemma facing agencies and OIRA of
how to jointly settle a large number of open methodological
questions in a collaborative fashion.
But as the system of regulatory review has evolved, nearly
all disputes between agencies and OIRA on cost-benefit-analysis
methodological questions have come to be resolved by reference
to the views of the professional economics community. The party
with the stronger claim to reflecting those views tends to domi-
nate, and cases in which either an agency or OIRA is able to im-
pose a methodological choice that is clearly out of line with
mainstream economic thought are few and far between.315
312 OIRA could also play different agencies off of each other, essentially free riding
on the economics capacities of friendly agencies to generate support for its positions.
313 See Part I.C.
314 This need not have been the case. See Sunstein, 23 Ariz L Rev at 1276 (cited in
note 1).
315 The most prominent example of a departure is the use of average values for will-
ingness to pay for mortality-risk reduction, instead of a measure that was indexed to
wealth. There is a robust finding that higher income is associated, unsurprisingly, with a
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Agencies' methodological influence, then, also springs from
their stronger position to convince outside experts. Because
economists have such an outsize role, there are obvious incen-
tives to attempt to influence them.316 Agencies' internal econom-
ics capacity and ability to fund outside research provide much
greater leverage to do so. If convincing philosophers that there is
a moral obligation to provide a minimum level of environmental
care for all citizens would help facilitate the process of regulato-
ry review, EPA would support philosophy conferences, encour-
age publication in peer reviewed philosophy journals, and en-
gage in its own philosophical research. But economists, not
philosophers, are the relevant community. While EPA's in-
volvement may not ultimately decide what the economics com-
munity determines is the correct answer to any given question,
it can almost guarantee that highly credentialed representatives
of the community will give it consideration.
It might be thought that, by demanding that cost-benefit
analyses conform to the dictates of welfare economics, OIRA has
in essence deputized the economics profession as an external
monitor on agencies, extending OIRA's authority over agencies.
This may be true to some extent, but in the process OIRA has
ceded control to an outside group that it cannot predict and that
agencies are in a strong position to influence. The history of
methodological development discussed in Part III highlights how
mainstream economic views have evolved in EPA's favored di-
rection and shows several high-profile instances in which OIRA
ultimately bowed to these external professional views.
Even if OIRA had no choice but to feign acceptance of agen-
cy appeals to mainstream economics, it could still reject them in-
higher willingness to pay to avoid mortality risks. Viscusi and Aldy, 27 J Risk & Uncer-
tainty at 36 (cited in note 6). Though an income-adjusted value of statistical life based on
the demographic characteristics of the exposed population would therefore be justified
from an efficiency perspective, it would raise normative egalitarian concerns and likely
spark political opposition. It is telling that EPA's 2010 Guidelines recommend adjust-
ment of benefits figures to reflect national income growth, but not based on population
characteristics. 2010 EPA Guidelines at B-4 to -5 (cited in note 4).
316 The incentive to influence economists exists not only for agencies, but also for
interest groups seeking to convince agencies. As discussed in Part III.C, one of the most
successful efforts to revise agency cost-benefit-analysis practices was conducted by the
oil industry in the wake of the Exxon Valdez oil spill. By sponsoring a conference on con-
tingent-valuation methodology, with respected economists as participants, this interest
group was able to place contingent valuation in severe danger. Imbalanced participation
in expert-driven processes can distort how this accountability mechanism affects agen-
cies, a problem that has occurred with cost-benefit analysis. Revesz and Livermore, Re-
taking Rationality at 9-12 (cited in note 51).
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ternally and substitute its own values, in essence creating "two
sets of books" of regulatory costs and benefits. But the safe-
harbor effect undermines this strategy. If, as a practical matter,
OIRA finds it difficult to object to rules that pass a cost-benefit
test according to methodologies largely developed by agencies,
cost-benefit analysis will continue to be an impediment to the
free exercise of review power, whatever OIRA's books happen to
say. The overall effect of cost-benefit analysis within the princi-
pal-supervisor-agent model would be to increase the residual
discretion held by agencies.
The real world of agency relationships is also more complex
than a simple principal-supervisor-agent model would suggest.317
Senior leadership at agencies is composed of political appointees
loyal to the president;318 OIRA's claim to better represent presi-
dential preferences in intraexecutive debates is therefore
shaky.319 Often, during the course of review, a career bureaucrat
at OIRA will evaluate choices made by political appointees at
agencies. This inverts the standard principal-agent relationship.
The relationships of career staff at OIRA and career staff at
agencies are not obviously well characterized by the principal-
agent model. Within agencies and OIRA, the presence of both
career staff and political appointees creates the possibility of in-
ternal principal-agent dynamics.
Furthermore, there is a multiple-principal problem in the
American system. Congress is sometimes characterized as the
main principal that dictates the work of agencies.320 Interest
groups also have an important role in the American political
317 Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Positive Political Dimensions of Regulatory Reform, 72
Wash U L Q 1, 39-40 (1994) (noting that "decisionmakers in public agencies are involved
in a myriad of different relationships" more complex than the principal-agent model im-
plies).
318 See Donald P. Moynihan and Alasdair S. Roberts, The Triumph of Loyalty over
Competence: The Bush Administration and the Exhaustion of the Politicized Presidency,
70 Pub Admin Rev 572, 573-74 (2010); David J. Barron, From Takeover to Merger: Re-
forming Administrative Law in an Age of Agency Politicization, 76 Geo Wash L Rev 1095,
1097 (2008) (arguing that politicization is a fact that must be taken into account in ad-
ministrative law scholarship). But see Robert F. Durant and William G. Resh, "Presiden-
tializing" the Bureaucracy, in Robert F. Durant, ed, The Oxford Handbook of American
Bureaucracy 545, 561-62 (Oxford 2011) (questioning the efficacy of politicization as a
control mechanism).
319 See Bagley and Revesz, 106 Colum L Rev at 1308 (cited in note 41).
320 See, for example, Barry R. Weingast and Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion
or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 91
J Polit Econ 765, 792 (1983) (arguing that congressional committees exert considerable
influence over agencies).
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system, and the broader public can be thought of as a kind of ul-
timate principal to which all government officials are (or should
be) ultimately accountable. This multiple-principal problem not
only muddies, from a normative perspective, lines of authority,
but also allows agents greater freedom of motion to express their
preferences.321
Within this network of principal-agent relationships, reduc-
ing information asymmetries through cost-benefit analysis
would shift the balance of power in complex ways. Political ap-
pointees within agencies and OIRA may indeed benefit from in-
formation disclosure, which would facilitate political control. But
in cases of conflict between OIRA and political staff at agencies,
there is an ambiguous effect. Regulatory-impact analysis may be
used by technocrats at OIRA to undermine the desires of politi-
cal appointees at agencies. In addition, Congress and the broad-
er public can also access this information, which facilitates their
ability to hold agencies to account, potentially exacerbating the
multiple-principals problem.
The safe-harbor effect and agency influence over the meth-
odology have complicated effects within this more fully articu-
lated model of principal-agent relationships. In particular, it is
career bureaucrats that are best positioned to influence cost-
benefit-analysis methodology. Methodological development takes
years, but the length of tenure for a typical political appointee is
quite short.322 Political appointees are also, in general, poorly po-
sitioned to understand the methodological complexities of cost-
benefit analysis. For the same reasons, even the power that
OIRA exercises over the technique is largely held by careerists.
If it is the career bureaucracy that shapes the methodology,
the information value of cost-benefit analysis would be reduced
for political principals, including political appointees within
agencies and the White House, Congress, and the public. Politi-
cal principals will often not be aware of, or decide not to concern
themselves with, methodological complexity, preferring to focus
on the bottom line in an analysis. In those cases, they are all but
abdicating their oversight authority to the accrued past deci-
sions of career bureaucrats within agencies and OIRA. Given
cognitive limitations and the time pressures faced by many po-
321 See generally Hammond and Knott, 12 J L, Econ & Org 119 (cited in note 42).
322 See James P. Pfiffner, Political Appointees and Career Executives: The Democra-
cy-Bureaucracy Nexus in the Third Century, 47 Pub Admin Rev 57, 60 (1987) (referring
to political appointees as "birds of passage").
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litical principals, this result may be all but a foregone conclu-
sion. Political principals are also constrained by norms of con-
formity to past practice and the need to avoid unnecessary dis-
putes: deferring to past interpretations of cost-benefit analysis
and avoiding interference with rules that clearly pass a cost-
benefit test may be the easiest course of action in many cases. At
the very least, in a multiple-principal environment, principals
that favor an agency proposal falling within the safe harbor will
be at an advantage.
This Section has painted a fairly complex picture of how the
principal-agent model informs our understanding of the role of
cost-benefit analysis in the administrative state. This picture
contrasts sharply with the prevailing view, which has the ad-
vantage of parsimony but is ultimately misleading. To summa-
rize the argument presented here: even when cost-benefit analy-
sis helps reduce information asymmetries in the executive
branch, the result will sometimes simply be to favor certain
principals at the expense of others, or certain agents at the ex-
pense of other agents or even principals. Furthermore, the safe-
harbor effect and agency methodological influence mean that
agents can often use cost-benefit analysis to keep their own
principals in line. Ultimately, the net effect of the cost-benefit-
analysis requirement on the relative balance of power between
principals and agents is ambiguous and deeply unpredictable.
B. A Deliberative Model
This Section builds on the prior discussion by relaxing an
important assumption of the principal-agent model. In the
standard model, principals and agents are assumed to have rela-
tively stable, nonmalleable preferences and seek to maximize
the satisfaction of those preferences subject to their constraints.
Any influence that agents or principals might have on each oth-
er's preferences are outside the model. But there are reasons to
believe that, at least within the executive branch, actors influ-
ence each other's preferences on a regular basis through infor-
mation provision, socialization and acculturation, normative
pressure, or simply reasoned argument.323 If preferences are at
323 As noted by Professor Jodi Short, "[a]gencies are disciplined not solely by the
constraints of rationality, legal doctrine, and political power, but also by the social and
institutional environments in which they are embedded." Jodi L. Short, The Political
Turn in American Administrative Law: Power, Rationality, and Reasons, 61 Duke L J
1811, 1816 (2012).
20141
The University of Chicago Law Review [81:609
least somewhat subject to these kinds of influences, then rela-
tionships within the executive branch can be thought of as hav-
ing a deliberative component,32 4 involving collaboration toward
shared goals rather than perpetual conflict.325 This kind of delib-
eration and collaboration may be strongest among political ap-
pointees,326 but influence among careerists and between career-
ists and political appointees may also be common. 327 Regulatory
design also frequently raises purely technical questions that are
better understood as collaborative problem-solving challenges
than as political contests. 328
324 An important component of genuine deliberation is the ability of participants to
change their preferences based on new information. See James S. Fishkin, When the
People Speak: Deliberative Democracy and Public Consultation 39 (Oxford 2009) (stating
that "[d]eliberation requires that participants sincerely weigh the issues on their merits
[and] ... decide in the end on the basis of the force of the better argument") (quotation
marks omitted); Joshua Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, in Alan Hamlin
and Philip Pettit, eds, The Good Polity: Normative Analysis of the State 17, 22 (Blackwell
1989) (describing ideal deliberative procedure as one in which participants "state their
reasons ... with the expectation that those reasons . . . will settle the fate of their pro-
posal").
325 Professors Terry Moe and Scott Wilson discuss the ability of presidents, through
their personnel choices, to "produce a genuine team," in which "opportunism and conflict
of interest are greatly reduced." Terry M. Moe and Scott A. Wilson, Presidents and the
Politics of Structure, 57 L & Contemp Probs 1, 16-17 (Spring 1994). The bureaucratic
apparatus in this view is meant to "mitigate the problems faced by teams-by promoting
coordination, information-sharing, and applications of suitable expertise among individ-
uals who share the same mission." Id at 17.
326 For Moe and Wilson, the team model "applies with most force" to the most senior
advisory level within the White House because of a strong expectation of loyalty to the
president, although "the boundaries of the institutional presidency are unclear at the
margins." Id.
327 Individuals within agencies with "a persistent, patterned way of thinking about
[their] central tasks [] and human relationships" may be well positioned to exert influ-
ence on each other across appointee/careerist lines. Wilson, Bureaucracy at 91 (cited in
note 42). Norms of responsiveness to political appointees may also become embedded in
agency culture, so that careerists willingly shift their preferences depending on political
direction. See id at 275 (noting that during the Reagan administration, "in many agen-
cies ... the careerists served the policies of their ideologically distant chiefs"). When
agencies have a strong sense of mission that is shared by the president and political ap-
pointees, then influence and collaboration is also likely. See id at 95 (defining agency
mission and giving examples). See also Pfiffner, 47 Pub Admin Rev at 61 (cited in note
322) (noting that presidential appointees generally feel that career bureaucrats are re-
sponsive after elections install different political leadership); Grace Hall Saltzstein, Bu-
reaucratic Responsiveness: Conceptual Issues and Current Research, 2 J Pub Admin
Rsrch & Theory 63, 69-76 (1992) (clarifying definition of responsiveness and discussing
empirical work in the area).
328 An example of a problem-solving challenge that was badly misperceived as a po-
litical contest was a portion of an EPA rule making on nitrogen dioxide. Professor Rena
Steinzor argued at the time that OIRA had "weakened" the rule and that "[t]he conse-
quences for the public health are real." Rena Steinzor, EPA's New N02 Rule: A Tale of
Cost-Benefit Analysis and Agency Independence
At least one purpose of regulatory review in the deliberative
model would be to facilitate the exchange of information and ar-
guments across agencies and between agencies and the White
House. Cost-benefit analysis can serve this purpose by providing
a standardized format to facilitate intrabranch dialogue about
regulatory ends and means. Impact analysis aggregates and dif-
fuses information, provides advanced notice and allows time and
opportunity for internal comment and coordination, and brings
to bear expertise located in the regulatory agency as well as dis-
persed within other agencies and the White House. Cost-benefit
analysis may also help agencies identify the factors that are
widely agreed upon within the executive branch to be relevant to
a particular rule making.329
Under this deliberative model, it could easily make sense for
agencies to be delegated a leading role in developing the meth-
odology of cost-benefit analysis. Agencies have subject matter
expertise, familiarity with the regulatory questions under con-
sideration, and institutional capacity to devote the necessary
analytic resources to fleshing out the technique. If deliberation
is facilitated by charging the most sophisticated and expertise-
laden actor with methodological development, then agencies are
the obvious choice.
But even if intrabranch relations are understood in a collab-
orative light, there are good reasons to anticipate a safe-harbor
effect. Some disagreement between OIRA and agencies will re-
main, even if relations are good: disagreement is at the heart of
deliberation, and, as discussed in Part I.C, without conflict, reg-
ulatory review has no purpose. The same need to resolve those
disputes amicably will incentivize the development of a safe
harbor of established cost-benefit-analysis methodologies.
OMB Interference, CPRBlog (Center for Progressive Reform Jan 29, 2010), online at
http://www.progressivereform.org/CPRBlog.cfm?idBlog=7B607OA2-E4D9-CEE5-4D6EF5
DF5B19FB12 (visited May 15, 2014). The issue was the number and placement of road-
side monitors for the pollutant, which is primarily associated with automobiles. OMB
had asked the agency to consider raising the threshold size for a community to receive a
monitor from 350,000 to 500,000 people. Ultimately, EPA agreed with OIRA and used
the remaining monitoring stations to target specific vulnerable communities. Gina
McCarthy, then Assistant Administrator for Air at EPA, was quoted as saying that the
change avoided placing monitors "in the middle of nowhere" and that it allowed the
agency to "design the monitoring system in a better way than we had proposed." Brad
Johnson, EPA Official: OMB Involvement in N02 Standard Was a "Significant Win" for
Public Health, Climate Progress Blog (Feb 12, 2010), online at http://thinkprogress.org
/climate/2010/02/12/174563/epa-omb-no2-win (visited May 15, 2014).
329 See Sunstein, 29 J Legal Stud 1059, 1093-94 (cited in note 27).
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The safe-harbor effect and agency methodological influence
have important implications in the deliberative model. If agen-
cies are the primary entities charged with developing the terms
of the discourse, they can do so in a way that tilts that discourse
in their favored direction. This is not necessarily the result of
bad faith: when choices are called for, agencies will make them
in a way they view to be correct. But the accumulated result will
likely be a methodology that tends to be kind to the regulations
that agencies are inclined to propose. Stated a slightly different
way, if the terms of the debate are set by the agency, those
terms will favor the kinds of argument that agencies themselves
find persuasive, which are exactly those arguments that inform
their own internal decision making. Ultimately, preferences that
are shaped by a deliberative framework developed by agencies
are likely to lean in the agencies' direction.
In the deliberative model, the safe-harbor effect may be less
a prudential barrier to intrusive review than a signal that less
scrutiny is needed. Analytic resources are scarce, and if agencies
can persuasively argue that their proposals are justified accord-
ing to established and generally accepted cost-benefit norms, the
reasonable thing for actors in the executive branch to do is focus
on more controversial matters. It would not make sense to spend
time second-guessing a proposal that is, in the end, likely to be
worthy of widespread support. Coupled with agency control over
the methodology, this deliberative safe-harbor effect may be a
soft, but very effective, form of insulation for agency rule mak-
ing.
But the preference-shaping effects of cost-benefit analysis
may also operate on the agency as well. The selection of econom-
ics as the language of cost-benefit analysis drives agencies to
produce particular kinds of information.330 Theoretical models
must be developed that can translate empirical information
about physical regulatory effects (such as dose-response curves
for toxic pollutants) into terms that are cognizable within cost-
benefit analysis (like willingness to pay). Those theoretical mod-
els can be critiqued, defended, and revised. There is also a very
330 See Matthew C. Stephenson, Information Acquisition and Institutional Design,
124 Harv L Rev 1422, 1452 (2011) (noting how institutional design, including "a system
in which the agent's freedom of action is conditional on the agent's research effort," can
generate incentives for information production). See also Emerson H. Tiller, Resource-
Based Strategies in Law and Positive Political Theory: Cost-Benefit Analysis and the
Like, 150 U Pa L Rev 1453, 1457-58 (2002) (arguing that Congress imposes analytic
burdens as a way to increase decision costs for disfavored agencies).
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large amount of empirical information-engineering, toxicologi-
cal, economic, behavioral-that must be collected and analyzed.
Techniques for empirical estimation, default values, scientific
models, and statistical methods must all be developed and re-
fined over time.
The types of knowledge production agencies engage in may
affect their regulatory decision making, especially over time.331
Because agencies must continually collect information to antici-
pate regulatory costs, they may gain insights into how those
costs can be reduced. As scientific knowledge about the relative
harm associated with different air pollution increases, agency
regulatory efforts may shift to more dangerous activities. In his
extensive study of cost-benefit analysis at EPA, Richard Mor-
genstern found that, when analysis was important for revising a
rule making, it was largely through its influence on agency deci-
sion makers directly, not because of some threat from OIRA or
fear of public controversy or interest group pressure.332
The evaluation of regulations according to standard econom-
ic criteria may also have broad influence on executive-branch
perspectives on regulatory questions. This effect was anticipated
by early supporters of OIRA review. 333 Professors Elizabeth
Magill and Adrian Vermeule argue that reliance on cost-benefit
analysis by courts and OIRA will "expand[] the range within
which economists, scientists, and other nonlegal professionals
effectively choose agency policy."334 Professor Thomas McGarity
has conducted the most extensive research to date on the effect
of cost-benefit analysis on bureaucratic culture within US ad-
ministrative agencies. He argues that it promotes an approach
he terms "comprehensive analytic rationality" at the expense of
331 See Richard Lazarus, The National Environmental Policy Act in the U.S. Su-
preme Court: A Reappraisal and a Peek behind the Curtains, 100 Georgetown L J 1507,
1536-65 (2012) (demonstrating how the National Environmental Policy Act has influ-
enced government decision making).
332 See Morgenstern and Landy, Economic Analysis: Benefits, Costs, Implications at
457-59 (cited in note 127).
333 Writing in 1986, long-time defenders of cost-benefit analysis and regulatory re-
view Judge Douglas Ginsburg and Christopher DeMuth predicted that "[t]he greatest
benefit of OMB review [ ] may result from the agency mechanisms established to respond
to the kinds of questions that OMB raises." DeMuth and Ginsburg, 99 Harv L Rev at
1085 (cited in note 24).
334 Elizabeth Magill and Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power within Agencies, 120
Yale L J 1032, 1051 (2011). See also Short, 61 Duke L J at 1864 (cited in note 323) ("An
organization can be shaped in significant ways by empowered internal constituencies
that are committed to a particular set of values.").
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"techno-bureaucratic rationality. 335 These two versions of ra-
tionality have several different characteristics that, ultimately,
may shape regulatory outcomes. 336 He finds that though cost-
benefit analysis has not led to a complete transformation, there
have been many important effects, especially at EPA.337 These
effects may have grown in recent years as the methodology has
become more entrenched.
Allowing for the possibility of deliberation within the execu-
tive branch expands even further the importance of the safe-
harbor effect and agency methodological influence for under-
standing the role of cost-benefit analysis in the regulatory state.
Not only can cost-benefit analysis be used to protect agents from
political oversight, it might also be a means for agents to affect
the preferences of the principals. Cost-benefit analysis would
then be a means for agents to both shield their discretion and
project influence.
C. Presidential Power
Under both the principal-agent and deliberative models dis-
cussed above, cost-benefit analysis has ambiguous effects on po-
litical control, and agency influence over the methodology pro-
tects the prerogatives and projects the influence of career
bureaucrats. While there are some long-term effects on agency
behavior, especially as a culture influenced by cost-benefit anal-
ysis develops and agencies continue to produce the kinds of in-
formation that cost-benefit analysis demands, it is not clear that
these long-term effects particularly accord with presidential
preferences. There are especially good reasons to believe that
the direction of these deliberative, long-term effects were not an-
ticipated by the founders of the system of regulatory review, who
largely had an antiregulatory perspective: in many cases, the in-
fluence of cost-benefit analysis may have been to increase regu-
latory zeal as large regulatory benefits were discovered.
But this account creates something of a puzzle, since presi-
dents have created and supported a system that seems to have
335 McGarity, Reinventing Rationality at 5 (cited in note 79).
336 Techno-bureaucratic characteristics are: mission orientation, action orientation,
restricted planning horizons, bounded options, turf consciousness, and an engineer's pro-
fessional perspective. Comprehensive analytical characteristics are: neutrality, objectivi-
ty, quantitative orientation, comprehensiveness, thoroughness, consistency, open-
endedness, openness, and an economist's professional perspective. Id at 6-13.
337 See id at 303-08.
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such equivocal effects on their political power. Even assuming
that cost-benefit analysis provides information needed to carry
out regulatory review, why would the president not seek to bet-
ter control both the information (to avoid worsening the multi-
ple-principals problem) and the development of the methodolo-
gy?
1. Objective or ideological hypotheses.
One possibility is that the drafters of the system of regula-
tory review believed cost-benefit analysis to be an objective, em-
pirical endeavor, akin to scientific discovery, and that agencies
could be charged with developing the methodology without fear
of affecting outcomes. 338 A related possibility is that economics,
although perhaps somewhat flexible, imbeds a specific ideologi-
cal outlook, and in particular an antiregulatory outlook, that
comported with the views of the Reagan administration that im-
plemented it. According to this thinking, even if agencies were
charged with methodological development, they could not scrub
the technique of antiregulatory bias and may even end up inter-
nalizing some of that ideological perspective.
Both the objective and the ideological hypotheses are ham-
pered by their reliance on a high level of determinacy within
cost-benefit analysis or economic rationality. Certainly cost-
benefit analysis, broadly construed, cannot be understood to be
either an objective or even a particularly ideologically loaded cri-
terion, because it is so underspecified. As argued by Sunstein, a
broad "utilitarian approach to regulation [allows] nearly any re-
sult [to] be justified regardless of whether it maximizes
wealth. 339 Cost-benefit analysis could, in theory, embrace a wide
range of criteria, 340 such as subjective satisfaction, 341 objective
well-being,342 or human capabilities. 343 These other criteria are
338 Of course, even scientific fact is not free from political influence. See, for exam-
ple, 60 Minutes: Rewriting the Science (CBS Television Broadcast Mar 19, 2006) (examin-
ing the role of the White House in suppressing public disclosure of agency scientific find-
ings relating to climate change during the George W. Bush administration).
339 Sunstein, 23 Ariz L Rev at 1276 (cited in note 1).
340 See Michael A. Livermore, Can Cost-Benefit Analysis Go Global?, 19 NYU Envir
L J 146, 150-53, 178, 184-87 (2012) (discussing metrics that can be used in cost-benefit
analysis).
341 See John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco, and Jonathan S. Masur, Well-
Being Analysis vs. Cost-Benefit Analysis, 62 Duke L J 1603, 1617 (2013).
342 See Matthew D. Alder, Well-Being and Fair Distribution: Beyond Cost-Benefit
Analysis 61 (Oxford 2011).
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not fanciful, but they have been forwarded by serious scholars
and even adopted by governmental bodies.344 Given this range of
criteria, cost-benefit analysis would seem to embrace, at least
potentially, many ideological shades.
Even assuming economic-efficiency criteria, objectivity and
strong ideological valiance are both questionable. The large
number of methodological disputes discussed in Part III, many
of which remain at least theoretically open, testify to either a
lack of objectively correct answers or very poor epistemic access
to those answers-either way leaving many questions open. Any
inherent ideological bias in cost-benefit analysis is a subject of
dispute,345 and the malleability of the technique is problematic
for such a view.
It is possible, nevertheless, that the architects of the OIRA
review structure believed cost-benefit analysis and economic ra-
tionality to be objective or deliver obvious ideological results.46
But even if this was the case, the continuity of the current allo-
cation of responsibilities, which has lasted through presidencies
with profoundly different political preferences, is hard to ex-
plain. Path dependency might account for the persistence of the
system to some degree. But if the current allocation of responsi-
bility does not reflect institutional features of the presidency, ra-
ther than the ideological outlook of an individual president,
there would be recurrent threats to its stability.
2. Accommodation.
Even if the drafters of the Reagan order recognized the im-
portance of methodological development, funding for an aggres-
sive research budget for OIRA to support application of the cost-
benefit standard would have been difficult to secure. Congres-
343 Martha C. Nussbaum, Capabilities and Human Rights, 66 Fordham L Rev 273,
279-85 (1997); Amartya Sen, Capability and Well-Being, in Martha Nussbaum and Am-
artya Sen, eds, The Quality of Life 30, 31-32 (Clarendon 1993).
344 The UN Human Development Index is strongly informed by Sen's capabilities
approach. See United Nations Development Programme, The Real Wealth of Nations:
Pathways to Human Development 13-14 (2010) (providing assessment of several factors
meant to replace gross domestic product as a measure of development).
345 See Revesz and Livermore, Retaking Rationality at 173-75 (cited in note 51) (ar-
guing that cost-benefit analysis can be used to promote strong environmental and public
health protections).
346 If they believed that cost-benefit analysis would typically show that regulation
was not well justified, history has shown them to have been incorrect. See, for example,
OMB, 2012 Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations at 3 (cit-
ed in note 227).
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sional preferences at the time tended to be highly skeptical of
the regulatory-review regime.347 Indeed, funding for OIRA's en-
tire regulatory-review operation was cut temporarily by Con-
gress, because of fears of presidential overreach. 348 Only after
the OIRA Administrator was made subject to Senate confirma-
tion was funding restored3 49
OIRA is also located within OMB, making it subject to a
number of OMB cultural constraints. Located in the Executive
Office of the President-which is largely composed of political
appointees that shift during presidential transitions-OMB has
a very large career staff. The office has tried to develop a "strong
professional culture" of technocratic expertise in part because of
the need to serve presidents of widely differing preferences.350 Its
unusual status as a group of career staff within the Executive
Office of the President has resulted in a general tendency to
tread carefully with Congress and to not "plead too forcefully for
sizable increases in [ ] resources in spite of its significant func-
tions."351 There is a resulting cultural tendency toward lightness
of staff and a need to look to agencies for substantive research
and analysis that may have affected how OIRA was structured
and operates.
President Reagan also faced agency resistance to the impo-
sition of regulatory review. Political scientists describe a "cycle
of accommodation" between new presidential administrations
and the existing federal bureaucracy in which "initial suspicion
and hostility" on the part of incoming political appointees is
gradually replaced by a relationship of "mutual respect and
trust."352 This road is not always smooth.353 Where accommoda-
tion cannot be made, conflict can easily move from the staid cor-
347 See Copeland, 33 Fordham Urban L J at 1266-69 (cited in note 54) (describing
congressional disapproval of OIRA regulatory review).
348 Id at 1267. OIRA was still able to carry out its functions: it maintained its statu-
tory authority under the Paperwork Reduction Act and OMB was able to fund review
through its broader appropriation. Id.
349 Id at 1268.
350 B. Guy Peters, Governing from the Centre(s): Governance Challenges in the Unit-
ed States, in Carl Dahlstrom, B. Guy Peters, and Jon Pierre, eds, Steering from the Cen-
tre: Strengthening Political Control in Western Democracies 123, 133 (Toronto 2011)
351 Shelly Lynne Tomkin, Inside OMB: Politics and Process in the President's Budget
Office 11 (Sharpe 1998).
352 Pfiffner, 47 Pub Admin Rev at 60 (cited in note 322).
353 Bruce Ingersoll, Burford Out; Agency Is in 'a Shambles,' Spokane Chronicle 1
(Mar 10, 1983) (describing the resignation of Reagan's first EPA Administrator, whose
tenure was characterized by strong internal and external opposition).
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ridors of agencies into the political battlefield, with negative
consequences for both political appointees and agencies.
Given that some tension will exist between the current bu-
reaucracy and new political masters-especially those that seek
to unsettle long-standing practices-much turns on how conflict
is channeled. If it cannot be managed internally, bureaucrats
have a wide range of external tools that can be used if needed to
protect their interests. Congress is an obvious outlet, and career
personnel often have links to important constituencies that can
be activated. Additionally, the media can be used to great effect
to embarrass the president and his appointees. Revolt on the
part of the federal bureaucracy is something that the president
and political appointees would strongly want to avoid.
When OIRA review was established by the Reagan order, it
left both career and political appointees at agencies open to the
possibility that a more consolidated principal would exercise ef-
fective control. But because there was a clearly designated
standard for how review would be exercised, there were internal
channels for agencies, and in particular career bureaucrats at
agencies, to protect their autonomy.
When those channels are blocked, and methodological choic-
es are imposed in an overtly political manner, it opens the presi-
dent to genuine risks. The best example of this is the senior
death discount debate discussed above. A heavy-handed imposi-
tion of the life-years methodology, which was not well grounded
in the empirical literature and lacked support within the agen-
cy, resulted in very public conflict. Members of Congress
weighed in, interest-group pressure was brought to bear, and
unfavorable reports ran in the press. Though, of course, there
was no formal involvement of the agency, it is quite possible that
at least some agency personnel played a role. Ultimately, politi-
cal officials who supported age-related adjustments to mortality
risk reduction were forced to back down. 354 When EPA's tradi-
tional role in overseeing methodological developments was
threatened, a political toll was exacted on the George W. Bush
administration, a mistake that should leave a lasting imprint.
Under this account, the cost-benefit-analysis requirement,
and the degree of control that it afforded to the federal bureau-
354 The ultimate resolution of this controversy, of course, turned on many factors,
including the fact that senior citizens represent a relatively well-organized interest
group with substantial voting power. Other methodological disputes may not present
such politically favorable circumstances for agency-favoring outcomes.
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cracy, helped support the institution of regulatory review.355 Be-
cause the review process created an internal channel for agen-
cies to protect their autonomy, it helped prevent wholesale re-
volt against increased presidential control, battles for which
there would no doubt have been willing patrons in Congress and
among interest groups and that would have played out in very
public fashion. At a time when the executive branch is viewed as
ever more unitary,56 this provides a useful reminder that per-
suasion remains one of the most important presidential pow-
ers. 357 Embedded in one of the most aggressive structural asser-
tions of presidential authority over the regulatory process is an
allocation of responsibility over methodological development
that encouraged agencies to accept it. By ceding a measure of
control, while channeling agency efforts internally within the
executive branch, an agency-driven cost-benefit-analysis re-
quirement has helped allow the institution of OIRA review to
survive.
D. The Desirability of Cost-Benefit Analysis
This Article has focused on describing how agencies shape
cost-benefit-analysis methodology and has argued that the safe-
harbor effect coupled with agency power over the methodology
complicates substantially the role of cost-benefit analysis in
agency-OIRA-president interactions.
Positive descriptions of power relations in the administra-
tive state cannot help but implicate normative concerns. The
conflicting demands of accountability and competence, the im-
perfection of our democratic and bureaucratic institutions, and
more generally, competing conceptions about the role of govern-
ment all create fertile ground for strongly differing views of how
355 This need not have been an intentional choice on the part of the drafters; indeed,
it would have taken considerable foresight on their part to anticipate how this system
would develop. See Milton Friedman, Essays in Positive Economics 21-22 (Chicago 1953)
(providing the famous billiard-player example to illustrate that behavior need not be in-
tentional to be described through rationality conditions).
356 See generally Steven G. Calabresi and Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Execu-
tive: Presidential Power from Washington to Bush (Yale 2008) (arguing that from the
time of the founding, presidents have sought to impose their will on the executive
branch).
357 There is a longtime view that presidents are successful not through the exercise
of their formal powers, but through "resourceful pursuit of bargaining and cooperation"
in the separation-of-powers system. Moe and Wilson, 57 L & Contemp Probs at 13 (cited
in note 325), citing Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership
from FDR to Carter 10 (Wiley 1980) ("[P]residential power is the power to persuade.").
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society should structure administrative and regulatory decision
making.
Of course, many of the normative debates over cost-benefit
analysis turn on the substantive content of the standard. Objec-
tions have been raised, for example, that cost-benefit analysis
requires a morally objectionable commodification of goods that
belong outside the market sphere. 358 Proponents of the standard
have argued that because it tracks effects on human welfare,
cost-benefit analysis provides morally valuable information to
decision makers. 359 This Article makes no particular contribution
to these long-standing debates.
But many of the criticisms and defenses of cost-benefit
analysis are about power. Some of the most prominent defenders
of the technique explicitly link cost-benefit analysis to the (dem-
ocratically desirable) exercise of presidential authority over
agencies.30 Critics fear that cost-benefit analysis facilitates po-
litical control over agencies, a process they see as interfering
with the ability of the bureaucracy to exercise expertise in pur-
suance of publicly minded, congressionally endorsed goals.361
Both agree that cost-benefit analysis is a tool for OIRA to exer-
cise authority over administrative agencies, but they differ on
the question of the desirability of that effect.
Agencies' role in shaping cost-benefit analysis complicates
this picture. The argument presented here could be read to im-
ply that the polarity in this particular normative debate is
backwards. Perhaps proponents of agency autonomy should em-
brace cost-benefit analysis as a mechanism for agencies to ex-
pand their rule making prerogative. Conversely, perhaps oppo-
nents of agency authority should regard cost-benefit analysis as
an impediment to realizing their goals. The 2012 Republican
presidential candidate Mitt Romney seems to agree with this
view:
Where standards are put in place to constrain the issuance
of regulations-such as requiring the use of cost-benefit
analysis-they tend to be vulnerable to manipulation and
also disconnected from the central issue confronting our
358 See Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics at 190-216 (cited in note 11).
359 See Eric A. Posner and Matthew D. Adler, New Foundations of Cost-Benefit
Analysis 25-39 (Harvard 2006).
360 See DeMuth and Ginsburg, 99 Harv L Rev at 1088 (cited in note 24).
361 See Cooper and West, 50 J Polit at 880 (cited in note 12); Heinzerling, 33 Ford-
ham Urban L J at 1100 (cited in note 33).
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country today, namely, generating economic growth and
creating jobs. The end result is an economy subject to the
whims of unaccountable bureaucrats pursuing their own
agendas.362
A move by a prominent and ambitious Democratic governor 63 to
eliminate the cost-benefit standard in New York state indicates
that any newfound realization that cost-benefit analysis can
preserve agency autonomy (and hostility toward this effect) is
not a one-party affair.364
Whether proponents or opponents of presidential control
should embrace cost-benefit analysis, then, may turn on a politi-
cal judgment and may shift with the times. When presidential
prestige is relatively high, there may be a temptation on the
part of the White House to abandon cost-benefit analysis in fa-
vor of a more direct assertion of authority. In those cases, de-
fenders of agency autonomy may be forced to fight for cost-
benefit analysis as an at least partial check on centralized con-
trol. If presidential prestige wanes, there may be a greater will-
ingness on the part of agency-oriented interests to attempt to
overturn the entire system of review, cost-benefit analysis in-
cluded. The current compromise, with formal review cabined by
a substantive standard largely in the hands of agencies to devel-
op, has persisted for three decades, but there is no guarantee
that it will last forever.365
362 See Michael A. Livermore and Richard L. Revesz, Three Stages in the Use of
Cost-Benefit Analysis as a Tool for Evaluating U.S. Regulatory Policy 5 (Max Weber Lec-
ture No 2012/05), quoting Mitt Romney, Believe in America: Mitt Romney's Plan for Jobs
and Economic Growth 55 (2011).
363 Danny Hakim, Cuomo for President? Who Said That? Well, Dad, NY Times Al
(July 8, 2012).
364 In New York state, there was a robust practice of regulatory review, based on
cost-benefit analysis and conducted by a somewhat independent body in the executive
branch, the Governor's Office of Regulatory Reform (GORR). This institutional arrange-
ment was established by a Republican governor, George Pataki, in 1994 and was carried
forward by Governors Eliot Spitzer and David Paterson, both Democrats. But when An-
drew Cuomo took office in a landslide victory, with single-party dominance of both hous-
es of the legislature, he simply eliminated GORR and the cost-benefit-analysis require-
ment, transferring the regulatory-review power to political officials within his
administration. Executive Order 14, NY Comp Codes R & Regs Title 9, § 8.14 (2011). The
New York State Administrative Procedure Act does require that costs and benefits be
considered in rule making, but there is no requirement of formal cost-benefit analysis
and no executive enforcement mechanism. New York State Administrative Procedure
Act of 1975 § 202-a(3)(b)-(c).
365 The methodology of cost-benefit analysis, though, is likely "here to stay," regard-
less of its role in the regulatory-review process. Revesz and Livermore, Retaking Ration-
ality at 11 (cited in note 51). Agencies have invested a great deal to develop the method-
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There are other important questions presented by the
analysis in this Article. One, an empirical question with deep
normative shades, asks whether agencies have used their posi-
tion of control over cost-benefit analysis to manipulate it in a
pro- or antiregulatory direction, or have instead engaged in a
relatively neutral program of methodological development. The
presence of the professional economics community limits, to
some degree, the ability of agencies to conform cost-benefit anal-
ysis entirely to its whims, but important discretion remains.
There is a substantial literature that examines agency mo-
tivations, with many conflicting views on what agencies will do
when given discretion.366 Some view agencies as inclined toward
empire building.367 Adherents of this view may hypothesize that
agencies engage in manipulation to expand their authority. Oth-
ers view agencies as subject to capture by the regulated commu-
nity;368 they may view agency influence as tilting in an antiregu-
latory direction. Still others view agencies more as complex
collections of individuals embedded in bureaucratic structures
rich in-sometimes conflicting-incentives, norms, and practic-
es.369 Adherents of this view may hypothesize that agency influ-
ence over the development of cost-benefit analysis will have no
clear pro- or antiregulatory bias, but will instead reflect the par-
ticular civil servants involved, political direction at key mo-
ments, and the cognitive, personnel, and resource constraints
facing agencies. A more extensive history of the development of
cost-benefit analysis than the one offered here would be neces-
sary to settle this question.370
ology and it provides a useful tool to analyze impacts as well as a way to justify regulato-
ry choices that agencies should be loath to abandon.
366 See Niskanen, Bureaucracy and Representative Government at 192-93 (cited in
note 307); Michael E. Levine and Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Inter-
est, and the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J L, Econ & Org 167, 167-72 (1990)
(proposing that agencies may pursue private interests, the true public interest, or idio-
syncratic views of the public interest); Joseph P. Kalt and Mark A. Zupan, Capture and
Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics, 74 Am Econ Rev 279, 298 (1984).
367 See, for example, Niskanen, Bureaucracy and Representative Government at 36-
42 (cited in note 307).
368 See, for example, Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture
through Institutional Design, 89 Tex L Rev 15, 21 n 23 (2010) (defining capture and cit-
ing several prominent sources).
369 See, for example, B. Dan Wood and Richard W. Waterman, Bureaucratic Dynam-
ics: The Role of Bureaucracy in a Democracy 1-11 (Westview 1994); Wilson, Bureaucracy
at 81 (cited in note 42).
370 The two most detailed histories that are available, by Morgenstern and McGari-
ty, strongly favor the final hypothesis. See Richard D. Morgenstern, Conducting an Eco-
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An additional question involves the desirability of accounta-
bility by agencies to communities of outside experts. Putting
aside the particular characteristics of the economics profession,
there can exist a tension between expert accountability and pub-
lic accountability if, in the process of rendering their analyses
cognizable to experts, agencies make them incomprehensible to
the public.371 More important is the question of whether expert
accountability is a positive development at all, or instead re-
flects an undemocratic imposition of elite preferences onto agen-
cy decision making.
A final question concerns the knowledge production that
agencies engage in while developing cost-benefit-analysis meth-
odology and carrying out specific regulatory-impact analyses.
Knowledge production may seem like an overall laudatory exer-
cise, but it also represents a significant commitment of agency
resources. Few are likely to argue that research dollars spent
understanding the connection between particulate-matter expo-
sure and mortality are wasted. But the same consensus may not
manifest for theoretical treatises on the reliability of survey
methods to elicit preferences on the value of grizzly bears in na-
tional parks. If cost-benefit analysis-at least as currently prac-
ticed-asks the wrong questions, then the time and money dedi-
cated to answering them is not well spent. On the other hand, if
cost-benefit analysis is a reasonably good tool for focusing agen-
cy investigations on the issues that matter, it can have substan-
tially beneficial effects on regulatory policy.
CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that the role of cost-benefit analysis
in the administrative state has been largely misunderstood. Alt-
hough it is often thought of as a mechanism for centralized re-
viewers within OIRA to impose their authority on agencies, in
fact, cost-benefit analysis also has an important mediating role
that should not be ignored.
nomic Analysis: Rationale, Issues, and Requirements, in Morgenstern, ed, Economic
Analysis at EPA 25, 25-46 (cited in note 71); McGarity, Reinventing Rationality at 17-25
(cited in note 79).
371 This issue may be overblown if certain types of information included in a cost-
benefit analysis, such as "order-of-magnitude judgments," can be digested by the public.
Nathaniel 0. Keohane, The Technocratic and Democratic Functions of the CAIR Regula-
tory Analysis, in Winston Harrington, Lisa Heinzerling, and Richard D. Morgenstern,
eds, Reforming Regulatory Impact Analysis 33, 48 (Resources for the Future 2009).
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It has been agencies, not OIRA, that have taken the prima-
ry responsibility for developing the methodology of cost-benefit
analysis and applying it to their particular regulatory contexts.
As a consequence, agencies have many important pathways to
affect not only the outcomes of particular rule makings, but also
the basic principles and practices for counting costs and benefits.
And, indeed, they have taken advantage of those pathways:
EPA, the focus of this Article, has affected the methodology in
myriad ways that have, in turn, affected how OIRA conducts its
review and other agencies conduct their analysis.
There are several practical consequences of the reality of
agency control over the development of cost-benefit analysis. By
providing a safe harbor, the cost-benefit standard preserves
some degree of agency autonomy. It also encourages agencies to
engage in knowledge production, and makes both agencies and
OIRA accountable to a specific group of outside experts. The
overall effect on agency independence is ambiguous.
If agency influence over cost-benefit-analysis methodology
mutes OIRA's power, why have presidents allowed this system
to persist? This Article suggests that by channeling agency re-
sistance to the imposition of centralized authority within the ex-
ecutive branch, in which it poses fewer political problems for the
president, the current allocation of responsibilities helps pre-
serve the legitimacy of regulatory review. The negative political
consequences for the George W. Bush administration associated
with the senior-discount debate provides a shot across the bow
for any president who forgets that agencies have plenty of alter-
native routes to preserve their autonomy, if necessary, and that
no president is well served by revolt within the federal bureau-
cracy.
The normative implications are cloudier. The common as-
sumption that cost-benefit analysis and agency independence
are mutually antagonistic (a proposition that has informed the
views of both proponents and opponents of the methodology) is
overly simplistic. But whether one believes agency control over
cost-benefit analysis promotes or undermines democratic ac-
countability or regulatory quality should turn not only on judg-
ments about the desirability of agency independence but on be-
liefs about the political alternatives to the current arrangement,
judgments about the nature of cost-benefit analysis, and predic-
tions about whether the knowledge production associated with
cost-benefit analysis informs or subverts public deliberation.
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